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IN THE

Supreme Court
of the

STATE OF UTAH
UTAH COPPER COMPANY,
a corporation,
Plaintiff and Respondent.
vs.
STEPHEN HAYS ESTAT,E, Inc.,
a corporation of Utah, JULIA
HAYS HOGE, STEPHEN J.
HAYS, LAWRENCE .J. HAY8,
MRS. LOU GOREY, MRS. ETHEL
V. REILLEY and MARY LOUISE
O'DONNELL,
Defendants and Appellants.

Case No.

5302

Respondent's Brief
I
STATEMENT

Plaintiff is the owner of extensive mining properties in Bingham Canyon, in ,Salt Lake County, Utah,
1

and is engaged in operating them as an open-cut mme.
By the complaint in this cause it is alleged that plaintiff must remove from its mining claims large quantities
of low-grade ores or overburden whereby to disclose the
commercial orcs below and make them available for
mining and shipment; that the low-grade ores or overburden so removed must be dumped upon the surface of
adjacent lands in gulches or depressions in close proximity to the mining claims from which they were taken
and from which the commercial ores arc to be extracted;
that plaintiff had accordingly dumped immense quantities
of such material upon a large aroa in Dixon Gulch owned in fee by plaintiff, and that that material contained
small quantities of copper in carbonate and sulphide
form, in the aggregate amounting to many millions of
pounds; that such copper becomes soluble in water after
having been exposed to the action of the air and meteoric
waters; that the dumps in Dixon Gulch, like all the
others of similar material, due to the accumulation of
snow and the rain falling upon them, collect, retain and
become saturated with moisture, retard and equalize the
run-off, and a portion of the copper in the dumps is held
in solution in the waters within, and percolating through
the dumps, and such copper so held in those solutions
may be precipitated and recovered commercially. It
was further alleged in the complaint that before the
copper could be precipitated from the solutions, the
latter must be collected and conveyed through pipe lines
2

to a precipitating plant plaintiff had constructed for
that purpose.
Dixon Gulch is funnel-shaped, widening at the top
and becoming very narrow as the gulch nears the bottom of Bingham Canyon, and it has an average slope
of 26 per cent.

(Tr. 166.)

Plaintiff is the owner in

fee of that part of Dixon Gulch where its dumps are,
and thence upwards to the top of the watershed.

Im-

mediately below the dumps is the Bingham & Garfield
Railway fill, only partially upon defendants' property
and which occupies the space between plaintiff's dumps
in Dixon Gulch and the point on bedrock in Tract C
where the plaintiff diverts the solutions with which we
are here concerned into plaintiff's pipe line and thence
to plaintiff's precipitating plant. Almost the whole of
the surface of this area between plaintiff's dumps and
plaintiff's intake is occupied exclusively by the Bingham
& Garfield Railway Company for its railroad purposes,

for the most part upon land whereof plaintiff is the
owner of the fee, the remainder in part under a decree
of condemnation and in part by conveyance from the
defendants' predecessor in interest.

The copper solu-

tions, however, continue on down the gulch on and
above bedrock through and beneath the railroad fill to
plaintiff's intake on Tract C, where they enter plaintiff's pipe lines and are conveyed some distance down
Bingham Canyon to plaintiff's precipitating plant.

The

railway company's easements across that part of Dixon
Gulch between plaintiff's property and plaintiff's intake
are for railroad purposes and do not include the right
to convey over that area these copper solutions for
mining purposes, and because the defendants declined to
grant to plaintiff the right to convey these solutions
across this tract through and under the railroad fill,
plaintiff, to preserve its property in the solutions and
the copper they contain, was compelled to insti,tute this
suit to condemn that right, subject to the railway company's easements, limiting its use to the surface in its
natural condition, without any right to enter or penetrate beneath the surface or to disturb the condition of
the surface. By a wribing introduced in evidence in this
case (Exhibit 11, Tr. 60) Bingham & Garfield Railway
Company consented, so far as its interest permitted it
to consent, to plaintiff's use and occupation of this surface for that purpose.
Plaintiff's intake was constructed upon Tract C
and consists of a short tunnel driven just beneath the
top of bedrock, from the face of which branches are
constructed to the right and left that penetrate upwards through the top of bedrock and into the railway fill, thus intercepting all the copper solutions as
they flow down the gulch on and above bedrock from
plaintiff's dumps. Tract A is for a pipe line that conveys similar copper solutions from plaintiff's dumps
farther up Bingham Canyon. Tract B is for a portion of
4

a pipe line that conveys 'to plaintiff's precipitating plant
the solutions carried by the pipe line in Tract A, as well a's
those from plaintiff's dumps in Dixon Gulch intercepted
at plaintiff's intake on Tract C. The remaining tract
condemned was Tract G, for the construction and operation of an electric transmission line. When it came
to the proof, defendants did not contest the condemnation of Tracts A, B and C except wherein Tracts B
and C were to be used for the purpose of collecting
and conveying away that part of the copper solutions
in Dixon Gulch that flow through the railroad fill near
the toe thereof at a point the defendants have named
the "Hays Spring." But Tracts B and C are required
for the collection, diversion and conveying away of the
copper solutions in Dixon Gulch the defendants concede
to the plaintiff, so on the proof rle.fendants do not
contest plaintiff's condemnation of ·any of Tracts A,

B or C. Defendants do not contest the condemnation
of Tract G. Accordingly we are concerned upon this
appeal only with plaintiff's right to condemn Tract D.
With the filing of the complaint there was instituted
a very simple condemnation suit for purposes within
the express provision of the statute. But by their
several answers the defendants set up a novel defense.
The defendants alleged in their answers that while title
to the copper solutions produced by plaintiff's dumps
was in plaintiff when on and within plaintiff's property,
that when those solutions had sunk into the earth and
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passed from plaintiff's property and been commingled
with the waters within adjacent property and the subterranean waters of the earth, and had become lost,
that then they ceased longer to be the property of
plaintiff and became the property of the defendants
when upon or within the defendants' property-which
is a conclusion of law we are not inclined to dispute.
But defendants further alleged that defendants owned
the lower extremity of Dixon Gulch wherein is located
rrract D, and that defendants' property had within it
valuable copper waters, much of which arose therein
in the form of springs flowing the year round, and
that such copper waters had existed therein from time
immemorial; that defendants' property was highly mineralized with valuable ores containing copper and other
minerals, beneath which were springs, which, together
with waters from rain and melting snow and waters percolating in the defendants' property from the surrounding country, took up, absorbed and leached out, the copper values in such copper-bearing ores in place; "that
great quantities of the waters containing copper in
solution upon defendants' property in said gulch owned
by defendants arise to the surface in the form of springs
thereon,'' and that it was defendants' purpose to collect
those waters and themselves precipitate the copper therefrom for defendants' own use and disposition. Accordingly the defendants prayed that plaintiff's complaint
be dismissed, because the law gave plaintiff no right
6

to condemn easements over defendants' property to facilitate plaintiff's appropriation of defendants' copper
waters, or in lieu of such dismissal, that the defendants
have judgment for the value of the copper waters they
claimed, which value they alleged was "upwards of

$200,000.00.''
The case came on for trial and the court below,
the late Morris L. Ritchie sitting, upon plaintiff's objection refused to impanel a jury until the plaintiff's
right to condemn had been determined, and accordingly
the parties proceeded with their proof upon the preliminary conditions stated in § 7333 Compiled Laws of
Utah 1917 as follows:
''Conditions precedent to condemnation. Before property can be taken it must appear:
"1. That the use to which it is to be applied is a use authorized by law;

"2.

That the taking is necessary to such

use.
"3. If already appropriated to some public use, that the public use to which it is to be
applied is a more necessary public use.''
Defendants excepted to the court's ruling because
they were thereby deprived of a jury trial upon the
question of title to the copper solutions, an issue that
defendants' counsel insisted was ''the paramount issue
here" ( Tr. 15.) Defendants persisted in their refusal
to admit the obvious characteristics of this condemna-

7

tion
still
seek
does

suit. Defendants refused, and they apparently
refuse, to recognize the fact that plaintiff does not
by this action to acquire any copper solutions it
not own, and accordingly plaintiff cannot by this

action be made to respond in damages by way of a
purchase price for copper solutions, if any, of which
defendants are the owners. Were it to have been found
that defendants instead of plaintiff owned the copper
solutions plainti'ff sought to convey over the easements
across Tracts A, B, C and D condemned in this action, then this suit would have been dismissed, but defendants' concessions on the proof deprived them of
that defense. Defendants' persistent failure to appreciate the purpose of this suit, and instead to inject into
the issues that of title to the copper solutions and the
value ther,eof as an element of damages to be recovered
by defendants herein, is responsible for the excessive
length of the record and the immense amount of time
consumed in the trial of these preliminary issues. Plaintiff's case was covered by a trifling number of pages
of testimony. For instance, its direct examination of
plaintiff's witness Earl (Tr. 30 to 62) covered thirtythree pages of the transcript, but this witness was subjected to a eros's examination (Tr. 63 to 168) of one
hundred six pages. The plaintiff's direct examination
of its witness H. C. Goodrich (Tr. 290 to 310) covered
nineteen pages, but this witness was subjected to a
cross examination (Tr. 310 to 412) of one hundred two

8

pages; all for the obvious purpose of putting on defendants' case through plaintiff's witnesses.

There are

nearly four thousand pages of testimony in this oase,
the whole of which relates only to the issue of title
to the copper solutions. Not one pag,e of that record
is directed to the issue of damages, the
issue in a condemnation suit.

The

ultimate

parties stipu-

lated to the damage sustained by the defendants for the
value of the easements condemned and damages resulting to the balance of the tract by reason of the taking,
at the sum of $500.00, the amount offered defendants
by plaintiff before this suit was begun. (Tr. :3874).
The defendants appealed because the court below allowed them nothing for the copper solutions, finding that
the plaintiff and not the defendants was the owner
of those solutions. While the suit as instituted was a
condemnation suit, the parties stipulated the only item
of damages for which judgment could have been entered
in that suit. This prolonged controversy revolves about
one issue only, i. e., in whom is the title to the copper
solutions. Defendants could with greater propriety
have sought the relief they desired by suit to enjoin
plaintiff's diversion of copper solutions of which defendants claimed to be the owners. This has, in our
opinion, a conclusive bearing upon plaintiff's right to
its costs incurred in the trial below, and will be agam
referred to in the discussion of that issue.
When the Bingham & Garfield Railway Company
9

constructed its railroad across Dixon Gulch something
more than twenty years ago, certain of its engineers
feared that with the occurrenoe of cloud-bursts, the torrents rushing down that gulch might wash out the railroad fill, notwiths,tanding the open and drain-like char'acter of its construction, so to provide an abundant
factor of safety, a drain tunnel was driven through
the solid rock beneath the right of way, both portals
of which were in Dixon Gulch on the northerly side,
the upper above, the lower below the railroad fill, and
from the upper portal a flume was construct•ed around
the northerly side of the gulch above the fill by which
to intercept a part of the run-off from above and divert
it through the drain tunnel again into Dixon Gulch, but
below the fill. With the making of plaintiff's dumps in
Dixon Gulch, extending from high up in the drainage
area down to and against the railroad fill, all danger
from cloud-bursts ceased, for the dumps, like a
sponge or reservoir, absorb such prrecipitation, however
torrential, and release it so gradually as to cause no
damag·e. But as plaintiff's dumps gradually became
satu!'lated with the water·s accumulated from precipitation upon them, a part of those waters followed the
flume or channel constructed along the northerly side
of Dixon Gulch to the upper portal of the drain tunnel, thence through the drain tunnel and out the easterly or lower portal, thence over the railroad fill and
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into plaintiff's intake on Tract C. When it became
apparent in the course of the trial below that the defendants were claiming every little pool of copper water
on the surface that had spilled over from the drain
tunnel, plaintiff piped that part of the copper solutions
from the drain tunnel to its int'a]{,e on Tract C, whereby
to dry up the little pools of copper water that had been
created by the ·Spilling of the solutions from the easterly
portal of the drain tunnel. Defendants apparently do
not daim any of the copper solutions that flow through
the drain tunnel and thence into plaintiff's intake.
Their effort has been so concentrated upon the other
flow in the bottom of the gulch denominated the "Hays
Spring" that one may lose sight of the fact that au
equally large flow comes out of the drain tunnel, is
intercepted in the same intake and diverted and conveyed away through the same pipe lines for which a
right of way has been condemned in this action. Wben,
therefore, mention is made of Dixon Gulch waters, title
to which is claimed by the defendants, it is only the socalled "Hays Spring" copper solutions that are referred to.
H must be further borne in mind that it is not the
contention of either party that any of the waters of
Dixon Gulch are public waters or capable of appropriation. What little water ther~e was in Dixon Gulch before the making of plaintiff'.s dumps there, plaintiff
acquired by arrangement with Jerome Bourgard and

11

J. W. Oddie, the original appropriators.

The defendants never claimed any right to any of the waters of
Dixon Gulch by reason of appropri1ation or the devotion
thereof to any beneficial use. The defendants frankly
admit that it is not the waters they want, but that in-

ste,ad it is only the copper content in those waters that
is of value, and the copper only is the thing to which
they are trying to establish title. The defendants employ the waters only as a. conveni,ent vehicle for that
purpose, tre-ating the copper solutions as percolating
water rather than as the product of plaintiff's industry.
Their whole case is ,an effort inaccurately to apply to
the copper solutions here involved the law of percolating waters whereby to def,eat plaintiff's effort to prot,ect its property in these solutions produced by plaintiff's industry and investment, and if successful, themselv,es to acquire the fruits of plaintiff's effort and discovery without contribution of any character on the
part of the,se defendants.
We here insert a copy of plaintiff's Exhibit 19,
which is a photograph taken fvom an airplane of plaintiff's mine and a part of its many dumps from which
copper solutions flow and are collected, diverted and
conv,eyed away t1o plaintiff's precipitating plant. The
canyon in the middle of the photograph is Bingham Canyou, branching to the right into Carr Fork and to the
lef>t into Upper Bingham. Plaintiff's mine is an amphitheatre in appearance, and occupies the upper central

12

portion of the photograph. Certain of the dumps of
overburden and low-grade copper ores removed from the
mine al"e shown on each side of the mine, and the names
of the several gulches in which those dumps have been
deposited are indicated by initials in red. For instance,
on the right side of the photograph the first dump from
the bottom is Dixon Gulch and is so indicated.

The

gulch at the bottom of the photograph, immediately
below Dixon Gulch, is Markham Gulch, into which
dumping had not been started when the photograph
was taken. The dump in Dixon Gulch was then in its
fir~st stages merely, but the photograph shows clearly
the enormous capacity of Dixon Gulch for the further
dumping of materia'l there. It 'also shows the extent of
the Dixon Gulch watershed, its broad expanse at the
higher ~elevations, its exceedingly narrow mouth near
the bottom of Bingham Canyon at plaintiff's intake, and
the very steep grade (an average gmde of 26 per cent)
traveled by the copper solutions made within the dumps
and intercepted by plaintiff's intake at the toe of the
railroad fill. The easterly boundary line of plaintiff's
property in Dixon Gulch is the westerly boundary of
the def,endants' property, and S'trikes across the gulch
at a point easterly of the railroad tracks and somewhat
down the easterly s1ope of the fill, as delineated on the
photograph by the white line, which shows the relatively
small portion of the railroad fill upon the defendants'
property. One looks to the south when looking at the

13

photograph; to the right is west, to the left east.

The

plaintiff is the owner in fee of the whole of Dixon
Gulch from plaintiff's easterly boundary to the very
top of the Dixon Gulch watershed, and hence plaintiff
is the owner in fee of the entire area upon which the
Dixon Gulch dumps and the greater portion of the
railroad Wl are located.
II
ARGUMENT

(A)
Point
By this action plaintiff seeks to condemn merely an easement to conduct across Tract D into plaintiff's intake on
Tract C a part of the copper solutions originating in and flowing from plaintiff's dumps in Dixon Gulch, of both which
dumps and solutions plaintiff is the owner. By the exercise
of the easements condemned only such solutions will be intercepted or diverted. There are not now nor were there at any
other time any other copper waters or solutions arising upon
or flowing or existing within either Tracts C or D.

(1)
Point
The lay testimony upon the fact capable of observation
and observed.

It is the alleged copper solutions of this V'agabond

thing the defendants have erroneously termed the "Hays
Spring" that are the bone of contention in this controversy. That is not a spring.

The waters flowing down

Dixon Gulch after the construction of the railroad fill
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of course passed through the fill and emerged from the
downward slope of the fill, but we know of no definition that would permit us to term that a spring. Water
emerged from the milroad fill whenever ther~e was any
water flowing down Dixon Gulch because it could not
do anything else. The point at whioh that water emerged was the situs of what the defendants term a "spring,"
but the location of that spring changed with the changing downhill slope of the fil'l. Ever since 1910 the bot'tom of Dixon Gulch has been covered by the railroad
fill, whioh has been enlarged upon certain ocoasions,
each time covering a greater area in the bottom of the
gulch, but with the possible exception of the defendant
Stephen Hays, no witness has been produced who testified he ever saw a spring in the bottom of Dixon Gulch
either before or after the construction of the railroad
fill, either at the present loca:tion of this "Hays Spring"
or at any other l'ocation within the defendants' property up or down Dixon Gulch.
Defendants state at page 4 of their brief that
''Most of the surface waters and much of the underground waters in Bingham have for many years shown
copper content. * * * For a number of years both
the defendant and its predecessors * * * have sampled
the waters in Dixon Gulch with a view of ascertaining
whether it would pay to treat these waters for copper.''
'l_1hcre is no evidence in this case upon which to substantiate this s1tatement. On the contrary, the evidence is
15

that the only waters in Bingham Canyon that have a
copper content are those issuing from the plaintiff's
dumps.

rrhere is no evidence to indicate the defendants

knew the waters of Dixon Gulch contained copper before
plaintiff entered upon its negotiations for the easements condemned.
The whole purpose of defendants' case wherein
weeks were consumed was to prove that there was a
spring, within the correc't definition of such, upon Tract
D, and that the copper solutions, except tho·se flowing
through the drain tunnel, were supplied by that spring,
and that inasmuch as a spring is a part of the realty
and hence owned by ·the owners of the fee, that part
of these copper solutions is the property of the defendants, and that therein the plaintiff has neither interest
nor title.

Defendants failed miserably in their effort

and have now apparently abandoned their case with
the statement that it makes no difference from where
the copper solutions come, hecause the copper solutions
at the Hays Spring belong to the defendants anyway,
putting themselves just where they were upon their
motion for a non-suit at the conculsion of the plaintiff's case very early in this proce,eding, a motion

.T udge Ritchie unqualifiedly denied .after some two days
of argument and deliberation. This geo'logic fantasy of
the Hays Spring was a cr·eature of the defendants' ingenuity, and certainly at the time of trial the defendants
thoug·ht it vital to their case, or they would have re-

16

frained

fr~om

so expensiv'e an experiment.

It is our

opinion defendants were correct in their first oonception
of the necessities of their case-proof of the existence of
the Hays Spring was vital to their case. An issue of such
importance is not to be disposed of by a mere assertion
of the fact without any effort whatever to substantiate
it, accompanied by the statement merely that it makes
no difference whether the f.act be true or false.

We

construe that assertion as an abandonment of their case,
but lest this court shall not construe it such, we have
concluded it our duty to review the testimony upon
which the court below found against
The def,endant Stephen J. Hays

~the

defendants.

~testified

as follows:

(Tr. 928).
I can't say that I or my family ever made
any use of the water's of Dixon Gulch. I never
used any of the waters in that gulch nor did my
father to my knowledge. We have no use for the
waters now; it is the copper in the waters that
we seek.
Such being the avowed purpose of

thes~e

defendants,

one's immediate effort in determining the source of the
copper waters is to

a~scertain

whether or rrot there were

any copper waters in Dixon Gulch before the railroad
fill and the plaintiff's dumps were made there; and
with relation to the Hays Springs, to ascertain whether
or not before the construction of the railroad fill there
was a spring on Tract D when the bottom of Dixon Gulch
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was free from obstruction. The railroad fill was made in
1910, broadened in 1914, and plaintiff began dumping
in Dixon Gulch in J,anuary of 1D:26.

Accordingly plain-

tiff called to the witness stand men who had lived in
Bingham and were acquainted with Dixon Gulch and
the water occurrences there before 1910.
Among such witnesses was Dr. A. L. Inglesby, who
practiced his profession of dentistry in Bingham from
1899 until 1920, married a daughter of Mr. Jerome

.

Bourg'ard, who for many years lived and operated a
butcher shop in the immediate vicinity of the mouth of
Dixon Gulch.

Dr. Ingles by's knowledge of Dixon Gulch

and the water occurrences there prior to 1910 was positive and precise, corroborated by nothing less than
three interesting photographs taken by or of him some
time between 1899 and 1906.
and 34 and 35.)

(Ex. 31 and 3:2, 30 and 33,

Exhibit 30 was

t~aken

in the narrow

mouth of Dixon Gulch that is now covered by the railroad fill and at a point below where the Hays Spring
is supposed to be.

(Tr. 528-9).

'l'he bottom of the

gulch appearing in that photograph and from there on
up the gulch three hundred feet or more to certain
placer workings was on barren solid rock.
Exhibit 30 was taken in the summer.

(Tr. 534).

Dr. Inglesby

called aUention on Exhibits 31 and 32 to a shadowlike structure on a ledge appearing in the upper center
of the photograph upon which he placed a cross in red,
and wrote the word ''tank.'' He described that tank
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as one into which the waters of Dixon Gulch were diverted from a point some three hundred feet up the
gulch just below the placer workings, and conveyed from
tha:t tank into 'Mr. Bourgard 's home, butcher shop and
into the Bingham Hotel for drinking, cooking and all
other culinary uses; and the witness recalled that Mr.
Bourgard watered some ten head of horses from these
waters (Tr. 535 to 538), and that a man named Shirk
and a colored man sold the waters from Dixon Gulch on
the streets in Bingham for drinking purposes.

The wit-

ness testif,ied that he bought this water and paid $2.00
a month for a bucket each day, and at times when the
men did not deliver it he had to go to a point below th'a't
wooden tank and from the overflow fill his bucket himself; that that was where Shirk and the colored man
got the water they peddled in the town for drinking
and other like uses.

(Tr. 541).

And the

witnes~s

testi-

fied that the photograph (Exhibit 30) was tak,en at a
point in the bottom of Dixon Gulch immediately below
the wooden tank on the ridge (Tr. 529), and when that
picture was taken the gulch was dry at that point,
which "was the usual condition during the summertime" for a distance of about three hundred feet (Tr.
535) up to the point where Mr. Bourgard and Mr. Oddie
took the water into their pipe line.

('Tr. 539) "When

it rained it was wet; when it didn't rain it was dry."
Mr. Herman Harms, State Chemist for the State
of Utah, testif'ie'd (Tr. 662-663) :
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Ordinary water used for drinking purpos•es
should be absolutely free from copper solutions
and other metallic substances. On the other
hand, ,a certain limit has been established, and
that is, pmetically speaking, one-tenth of a grain
of copper or lead o·r the other metallic substances
like zinc per gallon of water, i.e., 1/70 or .0143of a pound per one thousand gallons of water. If
one were to drink water containing in solution
a larger quantity of copper, vomiting or nausea
and vomiting would be bound to occur. The effect upon the stomach of drinking such water, if
it could be retained, would be to irritate and injure the mucous membrane and cause ulcers, spots
and similar abnormal eonditions.
Dr. 11,. E. Straup, a physician and surgeon who had
resided in Bingham and practir"ed his profession there
ever since 1896, testified much as had Dr. Inglesby to
the sale upon the streets of Bingham of the Dixon Gulch
waters from the wooden tank for culinary purposes
(Tr. 581), and that that water was good drinking water.
Dr. Stmup recalled a·lso where the water was taken out
of Dixon Gulch for the wooden tank, which he testified
was right in the bottom of Dixon Gulch about three hundred feet up the gulch from the wooden tank.

That

witness further testified that the bottom of Dixon Gulch
was solid rock exposed from the mouth of the gulch up
to the intake for the pipe line leading to the wooden tank
on the ridge (Tr. 583) and that tl)e gulch below that
intake was dry except at times of surface run-off in
the spring or when it was raining; that ''in the summer-
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time there was nothing there; it was all dried."

Dr.

Straup testified that there were two springs up the
g11lch far beyond this intake to the pipe line leading
to the wooden tank, and other than those two spnngs
he had observed no water in Dixon Gulch in those days.
(Tr. 585)

On his cross examination, responsive to

counsel's questions with relation to the waters that of
recent years flowed through the railroad fill, the witness said ( rrr. 593) :
I think the only judgment of
these conditions before as I saw
that, after the fill was there, it
that had ,always come from up
came down there.

a man knowing
them, would be
was the water
the gulch that

And again ('Tr. 602):
All I know about this whole story is, until
that fill was put in there, there was no obstruction to this water coming down there, at all,
in the gulch, and during that time this gulch
was dry at certain seasons of the year ... Now
when this fill was put in and this pipe line done
away wi,th that led to these t'anks, there was water began to come down the gulch later on.
A. L. Heaston, whose recollection went back to 1880,
testified (Tr. 546) that in the early days they brought
water into Dixon Gulch for placer mining by ditches
from Markham and Cottonwood Gulches, and from Carr
Fork, and that when the placer miners would let the
water go from their operations in Dixon Gulch it would
wash. out the gulch and leave the bedrock and boulders
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exposed all the way from the placer workings out to
the mouth of the gulch (Tr. 556); that he had seen
solid rock in the bottom of .the gulch exposed there for
two or three hundred feet (Tr. 557). Mr. Heaston testified that the only water having its source in Dixon
Gulch was in two springs, one six or eight hundred
feet up the gulch from the Bingham & Garfield tracks,
and the other still farther up (Tr. 546), that the spring
run-off ceased about the first of June; that the wooden
tank on the ridge had been built more than forty years
ago to supply the Bingham Hotel and others with culinary water (Tr. 548); that that was all the water Mr.
Bourgard had until the city water was put in; that the
water from Dixon Gulch was used in Mr. Bourgard's
butcher shop for twenty-five years (Tr. 551) and that
there was no spring in Dixon Gulch down the gulch
from the placer workings.

(Tr. 554).

John G. Hocking testified similarly to the wooden
tank and its waters, and the uses to which the same
were put (Tr. 568), and that he had never observed any
other waters in Dixon Gulch where 'the Bingham & Garfield Railway fill and tracks now are, or from there
down toward Bingham Canyon; that the water in Dixon
Gulch came from up above the placer workings.
Charles Kelly testified that he had gone to work
for Mr. Bourgard in his butcher .shop in March of 1903
or 1904, and had worked for him for eighteen years;
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that he had looked after the diversion of the waters
of DiX<on Gulch for Mr. Bourgard. That witness testified that in those days the water for the wooden tank on
the ridge was taken out of Dixon Gulch at a point just
below the placer workings (Tr. 621); that after the
railroad fill was constructed across Dixon Gulch there
was no more water, and he went up Dixon Gulch to
find what the trouble was and found that the railway
company was diverting the water to its depot buildings
through a two-inch pipe line from up the gulch.
Mr. Frank 0. Haymond, General Superintendent of
the Bingham & Garfield Railway Company, testified
that in July or August of 1911 he had constructed a
pipe line from the springs up above in Di:J{lon Gulch over
to the Bingham & Garfield Railway depot, station house
and bunkhouse, and diverted the water1s of those springs
from Dixon Gulch accordingly, the water being used
for culinary purposes, that Jerome Bourgard complained about his taking the wa,ter away from the wooden
tank on the ridge, and that the witness, together with
H. C. Go,odrich and Mr. Bourgard, went up to the
springs together, and Mr. Goodrich promised Mr. Bourgard he would keep the water in the wooden tank,
which was done by laying a pipe line over the surface
from the railway depot buildings down the gulch to the
wooden tank, the railway company taking all the water
from the springs but supplying Mr. Bourgard at the
wooden tank through that pipe line from the depot
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buildings. (Tr. 458 to 461). The witness further testified that he had been in Dixon Gulch ,below the railroad fill "hundreds and hundreds of times," that the
railroad fill had not been constructed when he entered
the employ of the railway company and that there was
then lots of solid rock exposed in the bottom of the gulch
below the railroad fill (Tr. 463), and that there was
no water in sight below the railroad fill except at certain 1seasons of the year during the spring run-off, meltmg snows and heavy ram.

(Tr. 464).

L. F. Strobel, a civil engineer, as well as a railroad construction and mining engineer of the broadest
expe~ience,

entered the employ of the Bingham & Garfield Railway Company in August of 1910, as division
engineer in Bingham, at which time the railroad fill
had just been started across Dixon Gulch (Tr. 431).
The witness testif,ied that at tha;t time he had made
certain observations with particular reference to the
occurrence of water in the gulch, and that he noted a
little trickle of water on bedrock beneath where the
lower portion of the fill would be made, which water
was being collected and diverted into the wooden tank
on the ridge; that there were no springs within that
area; that the springs were five or six hundred feet
above the railroad tracks westerly of the boundary of
defendants' property and within the property of plaintiff; that the water from those springs was being used
for drinking and other culinary purposes by the con24

tractors and gangs on t'he grade (Tr. 435); that Exhibit 30 was a· photograph of the lower portion of Dixon
Gulch a:t the lower part of r.l'ract D, which ''rises up
rather fast and that was all bedrock in there." (rrr. 438)
Harry Bowman testified that in 1915 and 1916 he
had sunk the incline shaft shown on the middle of the
photograph, plaintiff ',s Exhibit X, marked ''shaft,'' to
the right of Traet D, at which time he was employed
by the Montana-Bingham Consolidated Mining Oompany, which held a lease and option upon the defendants' property. He testified he had been acquainted
with Dixon Gulch for twenty-three years.

(Tr. 498)

His testimony concerning the wooden tank, the diversion of water from Dixon Gulch for that tank, and the
culinary usns to which it was applied, was much the
same as that of the others to whose testimony we have
referred. In the sinking of the incline shaH no water
was encountered until he had reached a depth of two
hundred feet, when the water rose twenty-five feet in
the shaft and remained at that level, from which he
concluded that was the ground wa:ter level, one hundred
seventy-five feet from the surface. (Tr. 514) And the
witness testified that where Bourgard and Oddie took
their water for the wooden tank was on solid rock (Tr.
504) up Dixon Gulch at an elevation above the wooden
tank, but that the water came from the springs up
above the placer workings; (Tr. 518) that otherwise
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the gulch was dry except when the snow and rain was
running off. (Tr. 508-9).
William Robbins testified that he had been employed by the T'own of Bingham from 1914 to 1927 as
ro,ad supervisor and water master, and that a cement
dam had been placed below the toe of the railroad fill
across Dixon Gulch, and the wa;ter passing through the
railroad fill backed up against the cement dam and
made a pool, where the boys used to swim in the years
1919 to 1922, and that at that time there was vegetable
growth in tha,t pool of the same character that he had
observed in all other water.

And as further evidence

that the waters of Dixon Gulch did not contain copper
in those days, he testified that the water had had no
effect upon the galvanized iron flume that had been
constructed to convey the flood waters from Dixon
Gulch across the street into Bingham Canyon.
2497).

(':rr.

When the several photographs composmg plaintiff's E]Chibit X were taken, the hillside appeared as
there shown, and it was only in the course of the trial
that the defendants uncovered two short inclines driven
by pr.ospectors s.o long ago that they had been entirely
covered over with surface wash.

Their location is indi-

cated by two crosses in pencil in the middle of Exhibit
X on a dashed line in blue about two inches above
Tract C, as delinea,ted upon that exhibit. They found
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the incline nearest the dump, the south incline, filled
with water that contained no copper, while the north
incline was full of copper water.

r:l'his oceurrence was

explained by plaintiff's engineers and geologists as a
diversion of non-copper waters into the south incline
by a porphyry dyke to which we will later refer, and
as a leaking of copper waters into the north incline
from the drain tunnel immediately above.

The water

did not flow from either of these inclines, although
there was a seep from the fre:sh water or south incline
so slight as not to be discernible to an observer unless
he were standing at that spot, where he could have
seen a slight moisture, so slight that it evaporated in a
very short distance, never reached the bottom of the
gulch and never flowed or trickled down the hillside
toward the bottom of the gulch.
Ray H. Kenner, the then Justice of the Peace at
Bingham, was called by the defendants to te,stify to
the water occurrences in Dixon Gulch before the railroad fill was constructed, and he testified that in 1896
he was prospecting and put in three or four hours
working in Dixon Gulch in the vicinity of the south incline to which we have just referred. He testified that
then the south incline was full of straw-colored water,
but that that was the only place he had observed on
that ledge (hereafter called the" sulphide vein") where
there was actually water accumulated.

(Tr. 1235) That

sulphide vein or ledge is the place in the bottom of
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Dixon Gulch where the Hays Spring, according to defendants' contention, is supposed to bubble up from
depth, but Mr. Kenner in his prospecting confined himself to f,orty or fifty feet either way from the south
incline (Tr. 1231), evidently because the south incline
wa,s the only place where he could get water to wash
his gravel----'he carried his gravel to the south incline,
not to the bottom of Dixon Gulch. (Tr. 1230) The
witness te'stified there was no water coming out in
Dixon Gulch under where the railr,oad fill now is. (Tr.
1222) This witness also testified that water flowed
down Dixon Gulch from under the toe of the railroad
fill in 1913, ·and that the water then wa:s clear, and
did not have the color of the water in the gulch today.
The witness selected Exhibit 44 as indicating the character of the water flowing in the hottom of Dixon
Gulch in 1896, the water at that time being clear, potable·
wwter. The witness selected Exhibit 41 as indicating
the straw-colored water of the south incline, which he
testified "had a slight iron tint to it." (Tr. 1229)
In addition to Mr. Kenner, the defendants called
four witnesses upon this phase of the tes,timony, Ammon
B. Stringham, Thomas Stringham, Richard D. Connary
and the defendant Stephen J. Hays. The Stringham:s
testified to the water in the north and south inclineR,
and while they were as liberal as possible in estima,ting
·the quantity of water in those inclines in the old days,
still their testimony was not far out of line with that
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of Mr. Kenner or with our present knowledge on the
subje0t, i. e., that the only water in Dixon Gulch on or
out of this sulphide vein from which the defendants
contend the Hays Spring has its source was from the
north and south inclines, which water is not now and
never was tributary to the waters in the bottom of
Dixon Gulch as they emerge from ~the toe of the railroad fill called the Hay1s Spring, or however otherwise
identified. Mr. Kenner and the two Stringhams testified that the water from the short incline tunnels was
not good drinking water, a fact of which we are presently aware, but that the drinking water was that which
went into the wooden tank. The defendant Hays and
his witnes'S Connary were in a class by themselves.
Their te1s'timony was so obviously prejudiced and contrary to the fact, so opposed to all other testimony in
the case, as to be worthy of very little consideration.
~"'or instance, the witness Connary testified with relation to the waters of the so-called Hays Spring in
the early days as follows:

* * * I observed the character of the water. It seemed to have qui'te a lot of acid in it
all the time there, that is, when I first was
there, in about 1890. That was when it was coming out of the rock ledge. After the B & G
fill was put in, there appeared to be considerable acid in it about like i't was before. The
water looked pretty much the same as it does
now. We couldn't Ulse i~t; some of the boys
tried to fill their carbide lamps there and they
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would have tins to dip this water and in a short
·time the tins would be full of holes. (Tr. 973).
The defendant Hays testified to substantially the
same effect.

That testimony is opposed to that of some

thirteen other witnesse·s, three of whom were for the
defendants.

Moreover, that water was being diverted

int·o the wooden tank, from which irt was used for culinary purposes for many years.

Plaintiff's witne,ss

G. C. Earl described the Bourgard and Oddie intake
(Tr. 2286 to 2291) and tes,tified to a survey made under
his supervision in September of 1912, whereby was
definitely located the then intake for the Bourgard and
Oddie pipe line to their wooden tank on the ridge, the
original notes of which were introduced in evidence.
(Tr. 2125 to 2132, Exhibit 83) Mr. Earl platted upon
E~hibit

VI the toe of the railroad fill and the Bour-

gard and Oddie intake as they existed in September
of 19J 2, together with the pipe line and wooden tank,
and testified that in September of 1912 there wws no
water flowing in the bottom of Dixon Gulch below that
intake; that bedrock was exposed below the intake in
the bottom of the gulch at the time of that survey,
and that the water to which the defendant Stephen
Hays and his witness Gonnary had testified was copper
water then and prior thereto the source of the waters
of the Hays Spring, would have flowed (if there had
been any such) into the Bourgard and Oddie intake
and thence into the wooden tank and would have been
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devo'ted to the culinary uses already described.
Mr. Earl testified that in October of 1912 plaintiff
had made a complete diversion of the Dixon Gulch
waters at the springs above the railroad tracks and
above the placer workings, and that thereupon the
flow at the Bourgard and Oddie intake dried up. (Tr.
93 and 2344) In July of 1915 (Tr. 202 and 2145) the
Bingham & Garfield Railway Company and plaintiff
secured other water f,or their use~s above the railroad
fill and no longer diverted the Dixon Gulch waters at
the springs above the placer workings, whereupon the
water again flowed through the railroad fill at the toe
in the bottom of Dixon Gulch wherever that toe may
have been, the location of the toe of the railroad fill
varying with the widening and sloughing off of the
fill.

This witness testified, however, that on March

12, 1915, there was no water flowing at the site of the
so-called Hays Spring (Tr. 2300), fortifying his recollection by the drawing on Exhibit 85 made at the time.
Mr. Earl's elucidating testimony continued as follows:
I designed the cribbing appearing in the
lower portion of Exhibit No. 24. The actual work
in connection with this cribbing was done in
picking out this particular location for this cribbing and deciding upon its construction * * during the spring and .summer of 1915. * * * I
made surveys with relation to that crib design.
The survey was made on March 12, 1915. I was
there during the entire time it was made. The
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cribbing was constructed just * * up the hill from
the concrete dam which is shown upon exhibit
6 and marked 'concrete dam.' * * * ( Tr. 2135)
* * 'L1 he rock wall was there at the time. This
cribbing was along the line of the gulch 225 feet
below the sulphide ledge as it is projected across
the bottom of the gulch. The cribbing was constructed on bedrock. * * *
And after identifying Exhibits 84 and 85, the onginal field notes and plat of that survey, and explaining
the purpose the cribbing was intended to serve, continued:

* * * Bedrock is shown on the plan, also
on the section 'solid rock channel' has been wri'tten with arrows indicating its extent as disclosed
by that survey. That was bedrock. It is also
shown on the section and written-with the words
written along the bottom of the gulch and reading,
''Bottom of gulch, solid rock.'' At the time thi,s
survey was made we had just completed the cons,truction of the track 4 the previous year, that
would he in 1914, and had enlarged Bingham
& Garfield Railway yards on the outside of the
down canyon, the east slope. (Tr. 2141) * * *
this plan also shows the toe of the railroad fill
on the date of that survey March 12, 1915. At
the date of my survey the railroad fill had not
reached the rock wall except that one corner,
the southerly corner. * * * At the time this
survey was made I examined closely the bottom
of that gulch in order to determine the proper
kind of construction to put in, in order to prohibit any fill material from going down into the
flume or canyon, and at that time there was llO
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water whatever appearing upon the channel of
(Tr. 2142) that gulch. The water from the
streams up above the railroad tracks was still
going into the Bourgard and Oddie tank which
was on the ridge. * * * This water was being diverted up in the concrete reservoir * * •
above the Bingham & Garfield railroad yards
through a pipe line, some of it being used in the
.buildings of the Bingham & Garfield Railway
above and enough was permitted to run down
to keep the Bourgard and Oddie tank supplied
which was on the ridge jus•t above this point
shown on this exhibit 85. The pipe line was
constructed in 1912, some two and a half years
•before. When I made this survey in 1915 this
water was conveyed t·o the Bourgard tank through
that pipe line. (Tr. 2143) All of the water except in flood seasons in Dixon Gulch above the
railroad tracks was colleeted in the concrete
reservoir and was carried through the pipe line,
none of it being permitted to come .down the
bottom of the gulch, this pipe line furnishing
the water to the Bingham & Garfield railway
buildings and also to the Bourgard and Oddie
tank. * * * The complete diversion was begun in the summer of 1912, I can't state exactly
what time, I know it was before the 18th of September and it was completed within four or five
days after the 14th of October, 1912.
( Tr.
2144) The B & G ceased to make this diversion
fr.om the waters up above the railroad track in
July, 1915.

* * * There is also a ground line shown
and a date December 9, 1919. In the four years
any matter that had been washed in that came
in some way there on top of bedrock and that
represents the difference between bedrock and
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so-called ground level. When I made those observa:tions there was no Hays Spring. There
was a little bit of water encountered in the construction of the concrete dam in 1919, and there
was also a little bit of water in the old (Tr. 2146)
Bourgard and Oddie diversion pipe line up above
in the gulch. The pipe line which Bourgard and
Oddie had used to divert the wa'ter in 1912 was
* * * still intact,-the part going underneath
the Bingham & Garfield railway fill, the place
where it entered into the fill was still intact
for a short distance out on the side hill. In
1919 there was a little bit of water coming out
through this pipe line. I remember particularly
because we tried to use that water for mixing
the concrete in the construction of the concrete
dam and there was not sufficient there to mix
the concrete. At one time in the construction
of * * this concrete dam we com1eded onto
that old Bourgard and Oddie pipe line and piped
the water down to the dam site hut later
we had to extend the pipe line up to the Bingham
& Garfield railway yards in order to get sufficient water to mix the concreie. That was in
1919; the pipe line leading from tlte concrete
reservoir in Dixon Gulch above the Bingham &
Garfield railway fill had been disconnected and
the water permitted to run down the bottom
of the gulch. (Tr. 2147) The area I haYe shown
on exhibi't 85 as a solid rock channel is about
80 to 100 feet below the falls, probably not quite
that far, 60 feet \Vould probably be more nearly
correct from the bottom of the falls and 80 to
100 feet from the top. (Tr. :2148) 'l'he falls
were below the sulhpide vein, if projected across
the bo'Uom of the gulch,-about :W feet in elevation below the sulphide ledge or sulphide vein.
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I cannot show on Exhibit 6 the toe of the
railroad fill in ] 916. The last location of the
toe ·of the fill that we have by survey is that
small part of it shown upon this last exhibit,
which was in HJ15; I am referring to exhibit 8fl.
In 19] 5 the Hays Spring was not then at its
present location. Of course, the ground line as
shown in pencil on exhibit 85 as result of the
survey in connection with the concrete dam in
December, 1919, shows that Hays Spring could
not have been at its present location. In 1915
the Hays Spring was non-existent. '~ * *
H. C. Goodrich, the plaintiff's chief engineer testified in part as follows:

*

*

* During the construetion of the Bing-

ham & Garfield Railway there was a man by the
name of Bourgard who claimed the waters in
Dixon Gulch. 'Phe Bingham & Garfield Railway
Company, under my supervision, had built a pipe
line from a spring in Dixon Gulch, taking all of
the waters from a point above the railroad embankment at certain seasons of the year into
this pipe line and into their various buildings
to be used for domestic and culinary purposes.
As soon as that diversion was made, Mr. Bourgard came to me and complained about the Bingham & Garfield Railway Oompany taking his
water. (rl'r. 325) 'l'his controversy ended in
an agreement between Bourgarcl and the Bingham & Garfield Railroad Company whereby the
Railroad Company paid Bourgard $500.00 for any
surplus waters in Dixon Gulch and the Railroad
Company provided a certain amount of water to
flow down Dixon Gulch to Bourgard 's pipe line
and tank. Now after the pipe line was built by
the Railroad Company the gulch below dried up
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and there was no water coming out below the railroad fill. * * * The waters that come from
the Utah Copper dump during the flood seas.on
when there is lots ·of water will come from the
Utah Copper property into Dixon Gulch underneath the railroad fill bC':tween bedrock and the
bottom of thn fill and in the fill itself and at
times will flow out of the fill through the soil
outside of the fill. (Tr. 328)
I would say that Dixon Gulch is a well defined channel. * * * The entin) gulch is a
well defined channel. I would say the waters
'that come through the fill and find their way
into tract D come through in a well defined channel. The channel is all of Tract D; they come
through everywhere in all of that area. During
the low season of the year I belie,·e the particular part of Tract D where they came through
is the bottom of gulch, * * * they would
also flow through the drain tunnel. Except in
the drain tunnel and the bottom of the gulch
they would not come through any other place
at low water season in commercial quantities.
(Tr. 329) * * * I say that in a low water a
flow like it is now that substantially all of the
water will come through the drain tunnel or come
down underneath and flow into the old channel
of Dixon Gulch; it will come down the bottom
of the gulch.
( 'l'r. 330) ~· * 'l'he spring
that comes out below the rock wall that we have
been talking about in the bottom of the gulch
comes out on top of material in the bottom of
the gulch, ooming out of the railroad fill. It does
not come out of the side of the hill. * * *
The water that I saw coming out of ihe bottom
of Dixon Gulch is above the concrete wall and
below the rock wall, * * * it was coming out
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of the material in the bottom of the gulch from
the railroad fill. There is at least 20 feet of
railroad fill in there. * * * My idea would
be that water is coming down through the railroad fill and finds an outlet on top of the material in the bottom of the gulch below the railroad fill. * * * All of the waters that make
in the Utah Copper dump will cross Tract D
and come out at the bottom. As to my knowing
of any other well defined channel through which
waters have come, or would be expected to come,
than the bottom of the gulch in Dixon Gulch on
Tract D, there is none; there is not any well defined channel that (Tr. 334) any man could possibly figure that water could come out of, m my
judgment, in Dixon Gulch, on Tract D. (Tr.
335) * "" ""
Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 30, which you show
me, looks like a photograph of a part of the bottom of Dixon Gulch. If it is a part of the Dixon
Gulch at all, it is my judgment that it would
be about where the concrete dam is shown
in Exhibit 6. rrhat is at the bottom boundary
of Tract DY. The concrete dam is the point from
which the ·waters are diverted from Tract DY and
taken * * down the raise into the tunnel. I
observed the bottom of Dixon Gulch before the
railroad fill was constructed across that gulch.
(':er. 4J 6) The photograph Exhibit 30 looks very
much like any place in the bottom of Dixon
Gulch within probably 40 or 50 feet around where
the concrete dam is located, it looks to me as if
the photograph were taken below the berrd in
the bottom of the channel; it is located about 40
feet above the concrete dam. Before the railroad fill was made there bedrock was exposed
at that point, as shown in this photograph. From
that point on up the gulch bedrock was exposed

37

for 150 to 200 feet. I made observation as to
the occurrence of water in the bottom of Dixon
Gulch and on the sides to the right and left where
the railroad fill was subsequently made. I observed there wasn't any water on that part of
Tract D that the railroad embankment was placed
on other than the water running down the channel, except during the rainstorms and periods of
melting snows. (rl'r. 417) rrhe water running
down the channel is the water to which I have
already te,stified to as having been diverted by
Bourgard and Oddie and the Bingham hotel people into this tank and for use in the hotel.

It is not our purpose here to abstract nearly 4000
pages of testimony, but we have tried to refer sufficiently to the testimony to establish this fact,-that there
is not now and never was a Hays Spring, that no part
of the water's plaintiff is taking into its pipe line from
Tract 0 in Dixon Gulch have their sources in any spilling over the lip of a synclinal basin (the sulphide ledge
or vein) or in any other manner arising upon the defendants' premises, but that on the contrary the whole
of the waters plaintiff so receives upon rt'ract 0 are
the waters flowing from plaintiff's dumps in Dixon
Gulch, thence through the railroad fill and down Dixon
Gulch on and above bedrock and across the premises of
defendants to and into plaintiff's intake on Tract C.
(2)
Point
The Geologic Case

Upon that record all the geologists m the world
38

would be powerless to conjure up a sprmg on Tract .D.
It was never our opinion that geologic theory could in

any manner assist in the proof of known facts capable
of physical observation that had been so definitely observed.

When a flow of water down a gulch on bGd-

rock has been observed to cease, when that flow was
diverted at its source, recourse to geologic theory by
which to determine the source or continuity of that
flow or the course pursued by it when not interfered
with would be ridiculous.

And when by actual obser-

vation the fact has been definitely determined that there
is not now nor ever was a spring upon Tract D, no
amount of geologic theorizing can persuade one to conclude that there is such spring.

The defendants, how-

ever, attempted that, at a great consumption of time and
money, necessitating plaintiff's response by its geologists also, and defendant's' geologic case proved as ineffectual as that of its lay witnesses upon the observed
fact.
Defendants' experts conceded frankly enough that
unless the Bingham & Garfield Railroad fill as interposed across Dixon Gulch became and was an impervious barrier to the descending solutions from plaintiff's
dumps, that then the copper solutions from those dumps
would not have seeped through the rocks in place into
the synclinal basin beneath, but instead would have
flowed down Dixon Gulch on and above bedrock as the
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culinary waters out .of the springs above had done
in the old days to the Bourgard and Oddie intake.
( Tr. 1329, and 1666 to 1670) There would therefore in
their opinion have been no Hays Spring, except in the
sense that waters flowing down the gulch on bedrock
pas,sed thr.ough or beneath the porous material there
and again appear farther down where bedrock was
exposed. Such was not defendants' conception of the
Hays Spring as pleaded nor as manifest by their effort in the cour·se of the trial. Now counsel refuse to
define what they mean by the "Hays Spring," contenting themselves with the assertion that it makes no
difference what it is, but at the same time contending
for all definitions, thereby enjoying a rare liberality of
thought and expression accordingly as events may seem
propi·tious.
The only purpose of defendants' geologic case was
to define the Hay.s Spring as the outlet over the lip
of the synclinal basin, or out of the sulphide vein,
of copper solutions having a broad subterranean source,
a spring in the true sense whereof the defendants were
the owners because coming to the surface on defendants'
property. In doing this defendants' engineers and
geologists conceded that it was necessary that there
be created and maintained to the copper solutions decending Dixon Gulch on and above bedrock, an impervious barrier in the form of the railroad fill that
would effectually block their natural course down this

40

precipitous gulch on and above bedrock and that would
compel them to seep and percolate into bedrock beneath,
down into the synclinal hm;in formed by the mas.sive
quartzite ledge that constitutes the foot-wall of the
sulphide vein, where defendants' engineers and geologists
speculated that those solutions had accumlated, and,
commingling with other copper solutions from a large
pad of the Bingham District, were spilling over the
synclinal basin in the bottom of Dixon Gulch beneath
the railroad fill within the boundaries of the defendants' property where concealed from view, thus creatmg the Hays Spring within defendants' domain.
During the progress of the defendants' geologic
case plaintiff concluded the porosity of the railroad
fill in Dixon Gulch was capable of a physical demonstration, and experiments were made accordingly by
James A. Marsh, the mine geologist of the plaintiff
company. Before Mr. Marsh had concluded his experi-,
ments the defendants made him their witness and proceeded to interrogate him about what he was doing (Tr.
1422) and to put in evidence as a part of their case the
information obtained from his experiments so far as
then completed.

In the course of defendants' examin-

ation defendants' Exhibit 64 was introduced.

Subse-

quently when called by plaintiff (Tr. 2501 et seq.)
plaintiff's Exhibits 98, 99 and 101 were introduced in
evidence and a more complete account given of Mr.
Marsh's observations.

There were three experiments
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planned and completed; the fourth was not planned.
They consisted in directing a flow of water upon plaintiff's dump and the railroad fill and recording the results at the so-called Hays Spring and the east or lower
portal of the Bingham & Garfield Railway Oompany's
drain tunnel.
ExPERIMENT

No. 1 :

November 5, 1928, at 1:25 P. M., water turned on
Bingham & Garfield railroad fill at point marked 1 and
colored blue on Exhibit 100 and marked "water" on
Exhibit VII (Tr. 3040) at which time there was a
normal now at the Hays Spring of 3474 gallons per
twenty-four hours. Water was turned off at 9:53 P. M.
on the same day. T·he first increase noted in the flow
at the Hays Spring was at 8:05 P. M. with a recorded
fl.ow of 4633 gallons per twenty-four hours, the maximum at that point being attained at 11:15 P. M. the
same day, with a recorded flow of 17,373 gallons per
twenty-four hours. There was no change in the flow
of the water through the railroad drain tunnel. (Tr.
1454 et seq.) It was estimated that approximately 43,000
gallons of water had been turned on the railroad fill
in the course of this experiment. (Tr. 2504).
ExPERIMENT No. 2 :
November 6, 1928, at 1 :25 P. M. Water was turned
on D. Dump approximately at the toe of the G dump
where marked on Exhibit VII "more water'' and Ex42

hibit 100 "water," and the numeral "2'' (Tr. 1428).
The water was turned off at 9:00 P. M.

The flow at

both the Hays Spring aml the drain tunnel showed
rapid increase. The flow at the Hays Spring at 1 :2i)
P. M. was 6000 gallons per twenty-four hours.

The

maximum flow was reached at 5:05 P. M. on the same
day of 108,000 gallons per twenty-four hours, the first
increase having been recorded at 2::-30 P. M. with a flow
of 61,920 gallons per twenty-four hours.
The flow at the Bingham & Garfield railroad drain
tunnel at 1:25 P. M. was 6949 gallons per twenty-four
hours.

rrhe first increase was recorded at 3:05 P. M.,

when the flow reached 7721 gallons per twenty-four
hours. The maximum flow attained from the drain tunnel was on November 7th, at 12:15 A. M., amounting to
23,164 gallons per twenty-four hours.

It was estimated that approximately 76,500 gallons of water had been turned on D Dump in the course
of this experiment.
ExPERIMENT

No. 3 :

The water was turned on D dump at the point
marked 3 on Exhibit 100, two inches to the left of the
letter "D" in "D dump," and on Exhibit 52 at the
point with rings around it marked "No. 3" with the
initials '' J A'' one--half an inch to the left of the words
"dump level," or about forty or fifty feet northerly
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from the southerly edge of the plaintiff's dump at that
point. (Tr. 2508).
rrhe water was turned on November 21, 1928, at
12 :00 o'clock noon in about an
gallons per

twenty~four

aver~age

flow of 20,000

hours. At that time the flow

at the Hays Spr,ing was 5610 gallons per twenty-four
hours. The increase in flow at the Hays Spring began
at 10:04 P. 'M. with a flow of 5915 gallons per twentyfour hours, constantly increasing until the maximum
of 12,705 gallons per twenty-four hour's was reached
at 11 :00 A. M. of November 22nd. The water was turned off November 22nd at 7:05 A. M. (Tr. 2525) The
Bingham & Garfield railroad drain tunnel showed no
increase in flow during this experiment. (Tr. 2534)
ExPERIMENT

No. 4:

The point at whieh water had been turned on the
D dump is shown on the photograph Exhibit X in the

upper left hand portion of that photograph by a blue
line at the bottom of the supply tank. Some time during November 17, 1928, someone, whose identity has
never been disclosed, without the knowledge or consent
of any of plaintiff's officials, disconncted the pipe line
leading from the supply tank, thereby turning upon
the dump at that point a flow of approximately 250,000
gallons per twenty-four hours. None of that water came
through the Bingham & Garfield railway drain tunnel.
(Tr. 2541) A maximum flow at the Hays Spring of
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46,328 gallons per twenty-four hour's was recorded November 18th, at 1:35 P. M. when the break was discovered and the flow was shut off and the pipe repaired. The Hays Spring flow on November 16th
had been 2894 gallons per twenty-four hours.
(Tr.
2539)
These experiments speak for themselves and are
conclusive

against defendants'

supposition

that the

westerly slope of the railroad fill is sealed and that
the solutions from plaintiff's dumps are accordingly
forced through the railroad drain tunnel. (Tr. 2667) The
defendants' witnes~s Crocker, who qualified as an expert civil and mining engineer, testified that the railroad
fill wa,s "'an effectual dam."

"That it stops the flow

of water down the gulch." (Tr. 1331) "I don't think
there is any water running down the bottom of that
gulch." (Tr. 1333) That the railroad fill would create
a pond or lake "probably up within fifteen feet of
the top of the fill, fifteen or twenty feet, up to where
it has been what I term hydraulically sealed." (Tr.
1358) "When I said it was as perfect a dam as a man
could construct I meant it." (Tr. 1371)
mony is not worthy of comment.

Such testi-

Mr. A. H. Christensen was in charge of the construction of the railroad fill acros.s Dixon Gulch, the
work having been done by the Utah Construction Company under contract with the Bingham & Garfield Rail45

way Company.

Mr. Christensen was a director and

vice-president of the Utah Construction Company. He
declined to describe that fill as a "perfect hydraulic
dam," but on the contrary described its construction
as a ''French drain,'' wherein the largest boulders rolled
to the bottom of the gulch preserving great apertures
between them to permit the passage of water under
and through the fill on down the gulch, and further
calling attention to the fact that the fill had been constructed upon coarse placer gravels and boulders, all
of which material was exceedingly porous permitting a
relatively free passage of water down the gulch.

On

direct examination Mr. Christensen testified in part as
follows:
I wouldn't define the fill that we built across
Dixon Gulch * * * as a perfect hydraulic
dam. In the construction of this dam the bottom of the gulch was filled with the coarsest
rock we had. ('fr. 2064) * * * 'l'he material
that went in there was ten per cent of it below
the quarter of a cubic foot and about forty per
cent was a quarter of a cubic foot to 18 cubic
feet, and fifty per cent from 18 cubic feet up.
The bottom of the gulch was boulders that came
from these placer diggings above, and the fill
was made on top of those boulders. ( Tr. 2065)
As to the character of* * * the natural soil upgulch from this fill, it was an old placer dump and
boulders * * * Farther up the gulch, there was
a great deal of oak brush and gras,s; * * *
There was no evidence of erosion on the hillside.
* * * I observed the west slope and west
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toe of the fill shortly before the Utah Copper
Company began dumping there. * * * Three
years ago the wash material from Dixon Gulch
against the west slope and toe of this railroad
fill didn't show any evidence of pooling. (Tr.
2067) * * *
and on cros.s examination in part as follows:

* ,. * The drain tunnel was put in, we
thought as a safety valve. I didn't think it was
needed. (Tr. 2091) We thought we had made a
French drain there that would take care of the
water without the drain tunnel. I remember
that very distinctly. I suppose the drain tunnel
wa·s a factor of safety. * * * The French
drain or the fill was in the bottom of the gulch.
The coarsest rock was put in the bottom. 50 per
cent of the excavation was rock and that naturally made the French drain and we tried to make
it as open as we could; we tried to as a safety.
More than 50 per cent of the entire west portion
of the B & G fill was rock, because there was
40 per cent of it loose rock that was open stuff,
too. The entire lower portion there is rock.
(Tr. 2093)
* * *
Assuming that as a matter of fact in 1913
a flood came in there which filled up the lower
drain tunnel and filled up the bottom of the
gulch and the lower drain tunnel to the extent
that the water backed farther, raised back farther
to within about 15 feet (Tr. 2099) of the top
of the B & G fill, as to whether or not a flood
of that character would be sufficient to seal
that fill, I would say that it didn't, from my
personal knowledge of it. I was doing work
there and was up there very frequently and the
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waters that came down there from the gulch at
that time while they raised up they very soon
disappeared. In addition to that the bottom
of that fill or that gulch at the time we commenced there had so much round boulders and
other rocks there that it would have to seal that
gulch up 150 feet above the fill in order to keep
it from running through under the fill. If the
residual matter were backed up 200 feet (Tr.
2100) I don't think it would seal it; I think
it was a sort of an underground channel all the
way down the gulch, where these springs above
the fill would go down in two or three places
they would come out * * * below. I don't
think you could hold water np to the bottom of
the fill; * '~ * all the fines or the silt in
that water would be carried through it, it did
not stop, * * * would carry it through on
the grade like that and it would carry it through
the fill and it would carry it on through. (Tr.
2102) I think it would do that forever. I would
think that in order to keep away from going
under that fill they would have had to dug a cut
or a channel there and put a concrete. or some
kind of puddling or other substantial matter to
keep the water from going under it. * * *
The porosity of

the

railroad fill, including its

westerly slope, was subjected to a most convincing test
only a few months preceecling January 1, 1926, when
plaintiff began dumping in Dixon Gulch. The plaintiff's
mme geologist, Marsh, related this experience:
I was in the court room yesterday morning
when Mr. Hyde was testifying to his illustration,
plaintiff's JI_Jxhibit 107. I lived in the vicinity
of this portion of Dixon Gulch from July, 1924,
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until about October, 1925. On the right-hand
·corner of Exhibit 107, marked the Bevins house,
that is the house which I occupied during my
stay in Dixon Gulch during that period. I lived
there in the winter time. I recall the hole as
shown in the middle of Exhibit 107, (Tr. 2992)
and the portion of the gulch indicated on this
exhibit as "Toe of building fill and bottom of
gulch.'' That illustration correctly illustrates
that portion of Dixon Gulch as I remembered it
in that period from .T uly of 1924 until the late
fall of 1925. July 3, 1925, we had a considerable
rainfall, the result of which caused a flood; at
that time I noticed some water in that hole in
the middle of exhibit 107. Due to this heavy
rainfall I became rather alarmed at the conditions at the house in Dixon Gulch, so I left the
office (Tr. 2993) of the Utah Copper Company at
Bingham-that is east of the B & G yards; it
would be over in this direction, in the upper lefthand corner of Exhibit 107; and when I left the
office, of course I had to pass over the tracks;
I generally took a path down around this wayjust below the B & G warehouse, and I came
down and noticed up on the edge of the railroad
fill,-I noticed the water that had collected in
this hole. At that time I followed a path that
would take me north of the B & G warehouse
and in a northerly direction for some distance
until intersecting the natural ground, which would
be on the lower part of Exhibit 107, about near
the point 3; and then in possibly a southwesterly
direction, I followed along there, passed by the
assay office, which is shown on the right-hand
corner of Exhibit 107, and then in a southwesterly
direction to the house which I occupied at that
time. I observed that the water had risen there
to about 15 or 20 feet from the edge of the B & G
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tracks, and after going to the house, I possibly
stayed there 40 or 45 minutes, came back the
same way; coming back I noticed the water had
entirely dis·appeared. (Tr. 29~J4) 'rhat was a
cloud-burst. It had entirely disapp0ared in between 30 and 45 minutes. I lived there during
the spring run-off of 1925. At that time I did
not observe any water accumulated to the west
of the west slope of the railroad fill. 'rherc
was just the one time which I have mention0d
now having seen any water accumulated there.
Y·ou ask what happened to this perfect hydraulic
dam; it didn't appear very hydraulic to me;
seemed rather porous and permitted water any
time it entered there to pass through it. * * *
Defendants' geologic case can attain no greater
strength than the supposition upon which the defendants
have founded it, the supposition that the railroad fill
across Dixon Gulch was effectually sealed by the deposit of silt along its westerly slope up to the level
of the drain tunnel portal, and thereby became an impermeable barrier or dam to the descending copper
solutions from plaintiff's dumps in Dixon Gulch.

The

obvious failure of this hypothesis, coupled with counsel's
emphatic refusal to discuss their geologic case in either
brief or argument, forbids our devoting as much space
to its consideration as we might otherwise have been
impelled to do.

We will therefore very briefly describe

their effort, and as briefly endeavor to show that the
effort failed, not only because of the failure of the
hypothesis upon which it was predicated, but because
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the defendants' geologic case was wholly ineffectual
within itself.
Assuming, for the sake of argument, that the copper solutions could no longer flow down Dixon Gulch
to the so-called Hays Spring, defendants' effort was
then to supply some subterranean course whereby those
solutions, commingled with others, their identity lost,
could be brought from depth to the surface in the bottom of Dixon Gulch as a true spring.

To supply that

course the defendants' geologists spent weeks in trying
to prove a synclinal basin the bottom of which was
intact and impervious, the lowest point in the lip of
which being the very bottom of Dixon Gulch at the
so-called Hays Spring, the presence of highly shattered
sieve-like quartzite beds beneath the plaintiff's dumps in
Cottonwood and Markham Gulches, in addition to those
in Dixon, affording an efficient collecting medium for
the copper solutions from all those dumps and the spilling of those copper solutions collected from these and
perhaps other sources and emptied into Dixon Gulch
at the Hays Spring.

Of course an expert can easily

enough create an imaginary condition suitable to his
purpose and may testify to it as a fact, but it is
far more difficult to supply the premises from which
his conclusions may be deduced.

So in the case at bar

the dips and strikes of the massive quartzite beds
forming this synclinal basin were such as to forbid the
conclusion that the synclinal basin underlay Cottonwood
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Gulch or could in any possible way collect the waters
of Cottonwood Gulch. (Tr. 2618) Instead, the massive
quartzite

~beds

of necessity form an impenetrable bar-

rier to the copper solutions of Cottonwood Gulch, for
they were actually so tipped up as to form the ridge
between Cottonwood and Dixon Gulches. (Tr. 2166, 2815,
2850, 2675, 3018.) Also the Markham dump had just
been started, had attained no sizable proportions and
was not capable of yielding a solution of any substantial
copper content.

(Tr. 192, 2678). The shattered quartz-

ite of the less competent member showed no evidence of
oxidation and hence the leaching of copper in place
was out of the question, (Tr. 2666, 2671, 3017) and this
lack of oxidation indicated also that the surface waters
were not seeping in appreciable quantities through the
rocks to depth. The defendants' geologists then reluctantly conceded that in all probability the copper in
the solution at the so-called Hays Spring was that derived from plaintiff's dump in Dixon Gulch, but counsel
contended that those solutions had pursued such a devious and unknown course from the dump in Dixon
Gulch down into this synclinal basin and thence spilling
over its lip into Dixon Gulch that title had passed to
the defendants by the time those solutions arose as a
spring upon Tract D.
Plaintiff's geologists showed that the axis of this
synclinal basin was not in Dixon Gulch at all, but to
the south at the Shawmut workings, (Tr. :2611, 2845)
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and the defendants' geologist, Dr. Pack, agreed, (Tr.
1741) 'rhen the plain tiff's geologists

and engineers

showed that this synclinal basin had been punctured
directly along its axis by these Shawmut workings,
(Tr. 2622, 2779) but that the water encountered carried
no copper, (Tr. 2624) and plaintiff's geologists and engineers showed that not only did the Shawmut workings puncture this synclinal basin at its lowest point,
i. e., along its axis, but that to the point where those
workings so entered it was nearer the plaintiff's dump
in Dixon Gulch than was the lip of the synclinal basin
in Dixon Gulch, ('l'r. 3665, Ex. 100, Tr. 3673, 3677) and
that therefore if the copper solutions from plaintiff's
dump were getting into this synclinal basin and thence
by subterranean courses to the Hays Spring, the water
encountered in the Shawmut workings nearer the source
of these copper solutions, i.e., plaintiff's dump in Dixon
Gulch, should have been at least as strong a solution as
that at the so-called Hays Spring, but the waters there
encountered by the Shawmut workings carried no copper.

From Markham Gulch this basin was penetrated

in a number of places and in no instance was copper
water encountered.

(Tr. 3003) Even in Dixon Gulch

on this very sulphide vein on the south incline the
water encountered carried no copper; apparently was
just as it had been in 1896, when Mr. Kenner carried
his placer gravel to that incline to wash it.

The cop-

per water in the north incline could have come from
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no other source than the plaintiff's drain tunnel, ( Tr.
2944, 2946, 2948) convincingly demonstrated by the immediate reduction in copper content of those waters
upon the sealing off of the waters in the drain tunnel
by the installation of the pipe line and the stopping
of leaks in the pipe.
103)

(Tr. 2650-2658, 2696, 2702, Ex.

Wherever this synclinal basin was punctured or

waters were observed to pass from it, the waters encountered or otherwise observed carried no copper.
So it became expedient, if possible, that the defendants abandon their sulphide ledge by which they
had pre,viously identified the impervious member forming the bottom of the basin and select another so far
up the mountain that the Shawmut workings would have
passed beneath it and not into it.

(Tr. 3321) The lack

of accord between defendants' geologists has been noticeable in this case.

Between them they have corrobor-

ated almost every observation plaintiff's geologists have
made. It is not surprising defendants' geologists should
not agree.

Mr. Crane hit upon a quartzite ledge way

up above the Shawmut workings and above the Bingham & Garfield railroad tracks, which he contended was
the sulphide vein; certainly this time he put it high
enough up the hill so that the Shawmut workings would
not puncture it and encounter fresh water.

Then of

course he could not get it across Dixon Gulch to connect
with that sulphide vein and ledge to which the defendants had irretrievably committed themselves.
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Mr.

Crane indulged in a wild orgy of strikes and dips by
which to bring this new sulphide ledge down to that of
the inclines in Dixon Gulch, and Dr. Pack refused to
be a party to the Crane effort.

Judge McDonough,

accompanied by geologists and engineers of both parties, devoted two days to an examination on the ground
of all conditions relevant to this controversy, and concluded, as evidenced by his findings, that the location
of that sulphide ledge was where Dr. Pack and the
plaintiff's geologists first located it below the prophyry
sill above the Shawmut workings, and that the Shawmut workings passed through not only the sulphide ledge
but the porphyry sill as well, into this synclinal basin.
Mr. J. J. Beeson, one of plaintiff's geologists, described as follows two reservoirs, one of copper solutions in Dixon Gulch beneath plaintiff's dumps, of
which the outlet is through the railroad fill and down
Dixon Gulch on and above bedrock, and the other of
fresh water within the massive quartzite beds comprising the great synclinal basin of the Bingham district. Mr. Beeson's references are to his Exhibit 100:
The copper waters flowing through the railroad fill at or near the rock wall, that being
the point that the defendants have termed the
Hays Spring, are not from this sulphide vein.
rt1 hose copper waters, in my opinion, are merely
waters that have come to the railroad fill near
the point marked 57, have percolated down
through the railroad fill, flowed down the bottom
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of the gulch on bedrock or on surface soil in the
bottom of that gulch and come out from under
the surface wash in the bottom of Dixon Gulch
at the point marked 60.
My observations of the flow of waters, not
only in Dixon Gulch, but in the Tiewaukee Gulch
where a great deal of excavation was actually
done right under the dump (Tr. 266-1) and I had
a good chance to observe the flow of the copper
waters-is that within that basin, * * *
there is usually a thick mantle of soil * * *
black soil and clay, and that surface has been
completely sealed. * * *
We have here a large reservoir which is
formed by the sulphide vein or the contact between the competent and incompetent member,
and that formation has been highly fractured and
surface waters have passed into it from the upturned beds, as exposed to the south of the
point where I have shown the outcrop, * * *
-the section there is highly fractured with northeast southwest fissures. These same fissures
would lead down under the bottom of Dixon Gulch
at different points; the waters have passed :iown
through those formations and reached the workings of the Shawmut tunnel and flowed out as
fresh waters. In the vicinity of Dixon Gulch, the
waters that have not been contaminated with ;he
copper water from the B & G drain tunnel, arc
fresh waters; and so that is my evidence that
that reservoir is filled with fresh waters.
Within that reservoir is another one which
is the natural surface of the ground as it appeared before the Utah Copper dump was placed
there and that surface (Tr. 2662) diverts the
flow of copper waters down into the bottom of
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Dixon Gulch; they pass down to the railroad fill
" * " (Tr. :266:3). T'hen the copper waters
percolate through that railroad fill, flow on down
the bottom of Dixou Gulch on bedrock and
emerge out of the point marked 60, that is, part
of the water comes out and a part finds an easy
aocess through the B & G drain tunnel and comes
out the portal at the point marked 58. Point 60
is the point that has been called the Hays Spring.
If the copper waters " " * pass down into
the solid rock below bedrock, * * * seep into
the fractured, broken-up quartzite, they would be
dammed by the porphyry dike, * * * they
would emerge-come out to the surface again at a
lower elevation, and the logical place to find those
waters would be in the fresh water incline which
starts ou the sulphide vein about the middle of
the porphyry dike, passes through the porphyry
dike and intercepts a number of small fissures,
and the water coming into that fresh water incline is fresh water. 'rhis porphyry dike would
act as a barrier or a dam which would not permit
the waters to flow down through the solid rock
and come out at any spring in the vicinity of
the sulphide vein.
The sulphide vein here is also impervious,
so we have a low point in the trough at the fresh
water incline, ( Tr. 2664) and the waters coming
out at that point are fresh water, so if any copper was going down into the solid rock, passing
through fissures and fractures-and this country
is highly fractured and fissured-it would come
out in the fresh water incline.
That would also account-the presence of
the porphyry dike here acting as a barrier, would
account for the fact that the sulphide vem, as
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far as we know it, is perfectly dry where it goes
through Dixon Gulch to the south of the fresh
water incline. (Tr. 2665)
The significance those fissures had to me
with relation to this problem we have under
cong.ideration was simply this, that, in the case
of this Jersey Blue fissure, it passes right up
under the Cottonwood Gulch and comes through
the workings of the U & I tunnel, the U & I
tunnel is flowing water at the portal and it is
quite probable that fissure does carry some of
that water at the portal, and that is fresh water
there and if there was a migration of that copper water through there it might possibly contaminate this water, which it doesn't; and these
various fissures through here, if they served as
a channel for waters coming from underneath
the Cottonwood Gulch or underneath Dixon Gulch,
either one, they would be intercepted by the
Shawmut workings of the Shawmut tunnel and
the waters flowing out of the mill tunnel would
be copper waters. Instead they are fresh waters.
There are five fissures shown intercepted by the
Shawmut tunnel, and I have also observed a fissure right at the shaft which faults the porphyry
sill slightly. That would extend up into that
trough also. (Tr. 2759) Immediately above the
Shawmut incline shaft the porphyry sill is offset for a distance of about 6 or 8 feet on a fault
which is about parallel to the axis of the syncline
and that fault would penetrate-it does penetrate the porphyry sill and passes into the rock
or hanging wall, and that would have a tendency
to drain any waters within that basin over to
that point of the hanging wall side of the porphyry sill, and there we observed fresh waters
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also. So that, if those fissures were channels
for water either from Cottonwood Guleh into this
syncline or from Dixon Gulch into this syncline,
and were means of conveying copper water from
one place to the other, it would be apparent from
the waters in the Shawmut tunnel * '~ *
To the same effect is the testimony of plaintiff's
geologist :F'rederick D. Hanson (Tr. 2811, 2815, 2817,
2819, 2939), arriving at his conclusion as follows (Tr.
2821) :
In my opnnon there is no other source than
the Utah Copper <lump in Dixon Gulch for the
copper waters issuing from beneath the B & G
fill at the point designated as Hays Spriug. It
is my opinion that those waters from that source
find their way to this point designated as the
Hays Spring by flowing on top of the surface
soil or at least ( rrr. 2t-l21) on top of bedrock
and not below it.
and the testimony of plaintiff's geologist, J. A. Marsh
(Tr. 3009, 3015).
(3)
Point
"These waters had a copper content in 1920 ... and had a
commercial content in 1926 and 1927, three or four years before, according to plaintiff's own evidence, the dumps in Dixon
Gulch should give off any solutions," Appellants' Brief, page
26.

The above is copied from appellants' brief at page
26 and relates for the most part to the testimony of
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George B. Rohbe, a witness called by the plaintiff,
who testified October 22, 1928. Mr. Robbe was a mining
engineer, the owner of a precipitating plant in Bingham
Canyon and was then engaged in the business of precipitating the copper content from copper solutions
from Mc.Guire and Dixon Gulches. Mr. Robbe began
treating the copper solutions of Dixon Gulch June 19,
1928, (Tr. 481) at which time the copper content in
those waters was ''a little over twelve pounds per thousand gallons'' ( Tr. 483) sampled below the railroad fill,
but the witness testified that had he not had a precipitating plant already built and in operation, with sufficient surplus capacity, those solutions would not then
have been commercial. (Ex. 64)
The witness had
commenced taking samples of the Dixon Gulch waters
in November of 1920 (Tr. 486), when his recollection
was that that water showed a trace of copper, that
is to say, between .0416 and .0832 of a pound of copper
per thousand gallons of water. ('Tr. 487) All his
samples were taken below the railroad fill. The witness
also sampled the Dixon Gulch waters in 1921, 1922,
1923 and 1924, during which period no increase in copper content appeared. In May of 1927, the witness
again sampled those waters and obtained a copper content of between eight and nine pounds per thousand
gallons.

(Tr. 493)

There follows on page 26 of appellants' brief the
following:
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The witness Earl gave the history of all
Utah Copper Company dumps. Practically all of
them remain from six to twelve years before
giving off any solutions. He gave as his opinion that it takes four or five years before dumps
give off commercial solutions,
and counsel refers us to appellants' abstract at pages
123-124. No abstract can be of much assistance wherein
the attempt is made to condense nearly four thousand
pages of testimony into five hundred pages of abstract.
For instance, at this point the defendants thought it
quite unnecessary to include in their abstract the witness' description of the transformation from culinary
waten; to copper solutions with the dumping in each
gulch. We resort directly to the transcript from pages
182 to 196 and one will search there in vain for anything in the testimony to support the statement we
have just quoted, that "practically all of them remain
from six to twelve years before giving off any solutions." Mr. Earl did not testify as to when the dumps
gave off solutions; he did testify as to what the experience had been as to the length of time required befor:
those solutions became commercial, and he was careful
to say that there were so many elements entering into
that consideration that it could not be said as applied
to any specific case that three or four years would be
required to produce a commercial copper solution. Mr.
Earl also testified on cross examination that the plaintiff's dump in Markham Gulch had been started in
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January or

:B~ebruary

of 1928, and that in October of

that same year the water carried copper, although not
commercial, (Tr. 163) and Mr. Earl testified as follows
with relation to the dump in Cottonwood Gulch, being
the gulch next south from Dixon Gulch:
The dump in Cottonwood Gulch was begun
in July, 1924. Prior to that time there had heen
potable water flowing in that gulch. It had been
used by the town of Bingham for a portion of its
water supply. Since that time a flow of copper
solution has developed from that dump. It i~
commercial in form. It became commercial ill
April, 1927. (Tr. 237) At that date there was
about four and a half milliou tons of material
deposited there. That material was of the same
general characteristic as that deposited from the
plaintiff's mine in these other dumps to which
I have testified; it comes from the same section
of the mine.
Mr. Goodrich testified with relation to the dump in
Cottonwood Gulch that the dump there was begun in
1924, but that on .July 7, 1925, the water flowing from
it carried 6.45 pounds of copper per thousand gallons
of water.

(Tr. 652)

One would of course expect some copper in the
water below the railroad fill before the making of the
dump in Dixon Gulch started in January of 1926. Mr.
Goodrich testified that:
The railroad fill -..vas begun in the summer
of 1910. The contractors got through their work
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early in 1911 and I think during that spring the
fill was completed by hauling mine waste from
the Utah Copper mine. . . . There has been a
track put through the yard and part of that material was added to the fill, but not very much.
I should say about sixty per cent of that fill
is overburden from the Utah Copper mine. (Tr.
419)
Mr. Earl testified:

* * * at right angles to the track the ad(lition in 1914 was about 24 or 25 feet ...
* * * from 1910 up to the present time
at right angles to the track all additions would
amount to probably 30 some feet. (Tr. 2377)
Sixty per cent of that railroad fill is of the same
material as is in the Utah Copper dumps from whi·ch
these copper solutions are derived, and of course would
yield some of its copper just as the dumps are doing,
the amount depending upon the quantity and grade
of the overburden going into the fill.

The copper

surrendered being trivial in amount, a mere trace, as
Mr. Robbe ascertained, i. e., between .0416 and .0832 of a
pound per thousand gallons of water. Were there no
other evidence it would appear sufficient to prove the
source of the copper solutions that the water below the
railroad fill so quickly after the making of the dumps
above showed an increase in copper content from
6/100th of a pound per thousand gallons to eight or
nine pounds.

That trace of copper prior to January

1, 1926, came from no other source than the railroad
fill, because the waters of the springs at the concrete
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dam above the railroad fill were still being devoted
to culinary uses.

Mr. Marsh testified (Tr. 468) :

From July, 1924, until late in the fall of
1925, I resided in Dixon Gulch at a point, I
should judge, about a thousand feet up the gulch
from the present Bingham & Garfield yards.
\Ve got our water for culinary purposes from a
spring nearby the house in Dixon Gulch. The
reservoir was possibly one hundred feet clown
the gulch from the spring.
The situation therefore with which we arc here concerned is not that of a spring rising upon Tract D,
title to the waters of which is in issue, but that of
copper solutions having their origin in plaintiff's dumps
of copper ores in Dixon Gulch on plaintiff's property
flowing down this precipitous gulch on bedrock and
in the railroad fill of the Bingham & Garfield Railway
Company, coming practically in their entirety from and
out of this railroad fill. From and out of those facts we
are called upon to determine plaintiff's right and title
in and to those copper solutions and plaintiff's right
to condemn, for their conveyance, the channel over
which they travel, together with the requisite easements
for their collection and diversion.

On this basis we

will discuss this question.
(B)
Point
The decision in the case of Utah Copper Company vs.
Montana-Bingham Consolidated Mining Company, 69 Utah
423, 255 Pac. 672.

Counsel urge upon this court that the above de64

CISion 1s authority for their contention here.

That

opmwn cannot be made to serve defendants' purpose
here.
In the year 1907 Utah Copper Company acquired
by grant the perpetual and exclusive right to dump its
over-burden and low grade copper ores in Tiewaukee
Gulch upon the property of the Montana-Bingham Consolidated Mining Company, and the grant provided that
Utah Copper Company should have the right at -its
option ''at any time to remove and dispose of any
rock, ores, waste or material so dumped upon the surface of said mining property."

Utah Copper Company

dumped somewhat more than six million tons of material in that gulch pursuant to that and other similar
agreements with other owners. It will be noted nothing
was said in the contract concerning copper solutions
making in the dump and seeping through it to the soil
beneath and thence to bedrock and thence down Tiewaukee Gulch over and across the property of the
Montana-Bingham Consolidated Mining Company. The
suit was one to condemn an easement for the construction of a tunnel to and beneath this dump, there to
collect the copper solutions that had made in the dump
and flowed down the gulch from above, seeping through
the surface soil to bedrock and thence along bedrock
and through the surface soil to the face of this tunnel
and into the intake Utah Copper Company proposed to
construct for that purpose. The tunnel so sought to be
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condemned was not within the area under the easement,
but the copper solutions were to be intercepted, collected
and dhrerted within that area, being beneath the dumps.
Those solutions were to be conveyed thence through the
tunnel to be condemned and into a pipe line across and
away from the defendants' property to plaintiff's precipitating plant.
The purpose in that suit and that in the case at
bar were the same, namely, the acquisition by the defendants in each instance of plaintiff's valuable copper
solutions.

Of course in each instance the effort was

clothed with an affected righteousness, the defendants
in each case contending that by operation of law title
to those copper solutions had vested in them. In neither
case did the defendants want the water, it being the
copper only that interested them. In each case the
copper solution involved was an artificial product
composed of ingredients all of whieh were the property
of the plaintiff, a copper solution that was a definite,
definable and identified substance from a known source,
the property of the plaintiff, a known owner, wholly
the product of plaintiff's industry and investment, mined
by plaintiff, transported and deposited in that dump by
plaintiff.
In the Tiewaukee case the two estates were one
imposed upon the other; in the case at bar the two
estates were laterally contiguous. In the Tiewaukee
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case the defendant owner of the fee contended that it
was a right reserved to the owner of the fee to have
the meteoric waters fall upon his land and that the
plaintiff did not have the right to prevent those waters
from falling upon and saturating its dump, leaching out
its copper content, and that those copper solutions belonged to the owners of the fee even while in the dump,
but especially after they had reached the natural surface beneath.

So in the Tiewaukee ca,se the defendant

contested the plaintiff's right to condemn an easement
for a tunnel and pipe line on the alleged ground that
plaintiff was seeking to collect and divert copper solutions title to which had passed to defendant, and that
inasmuch as defendant was itself collecting those solutions and precipitating therefrom their copper content,
they were being already devoted to a public use and
could not be condemned for the same public usc.

In

this a similarity will be noted to the issue in the case
at bar.

'l'he defendant appealed from the judgment for

plaintiff in that case and the judgment was affirmed
by this court.

The defendant wa;s not satisfied and

petitioned for a rehearing and its petition was denied.
Still not satisfied, the defendant instituted a suit in
the Federal Court to enjoin the plaintiff's collection
and diversion of the copper solutions on bedrock and
in the surface soil beneath the dump on the theory that
this court had held in the Tiewaukee case that plaintiff
was the owner of and entitled to the copper solutions
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only while in its dump, and that when those solutions
had reached the natural surface of the ground below,
title thereto passed to the defendant.

But the Federal

Court dismissed that complaint and entered its judgment on Utah Copper Company's counterclaim in part
a:s follows:
First: Defendant Utah Copper Company is
the owner of the dump or deposit hero involved
and all the earth, rock, ores, minerals, waste,
water and all other substances therein contained,
including copper and other minerals in solution,
also the water and copper or other minerals in
solution flowing, seeping or percolating therefrom, not only from and out of said dump but
from on top of the surface t-loil or rna to rial beneath said dump and on bedrock beneath sajd
surface soil or material beneath said dump and
from within the surface soil and material between bedrock and the bottom of said dump, and
that the fact that said copper solutions touch,
wet or saturate the top of said surface s':il
beneath said dump, or seep into or pnrcolnte
through said surface soil beneath said dump, or
touch, wet or flow along, over or upon bedrol"k
beneath said dump, neither has resulted nol· will
result in the passing from the defendant Utah
Copper Company to the plaintiff Montana-Bingham Consolidated Mining Company of title to
said waters and solutions, but on the contrary
the defendant Utah Copper Company was and has
continued, is now and will continue, the owner
of said copper solutions while in the (lump,
while on the surface of the soil beneath the
dump, while on bedrock beneath the dump, and
while in the soil and .material between bedrock
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and the bottom of the dump or the top of the
surface soil and material beneath said dump;
and said copper solutions have been heretofore
at all times, are now and will continue to be the
property of the defendant Utah Copper Company
while on and above bedrock, until the same shall
have flowed out and seeped and percolated in
and through the soil of the plaintiff's mining
claims, laterally beyond the periphery of said
dump or deposit and off of and from the surface right, interest and estate heretofore conveyed to defendant • • •

• • * •
Third: rrhat the plaintiff be, and it is hereby, perpetually enjoined from molesting, interfering with, collecting, impounding or diverting,
or exercising, asserlting or •claiming any right, title
or interest in, to or with relation to any copper
or other waters or solutions in or beneath said
dump or cleposit, or seeping, percolating or flowing from said dump or deposit, at bedrock in
the bottom of said gulch beneath said dump, on
the top of said surface soil or material beneath
said dump, on bedrock beneath said surface soil
and material beneath said dump, or while in the
surface soil and material between bedrock and
the bottom of said dump or the top of said surface soil and material beneath said dump, until
the same shall have flowed out and seeped and
percolated in and through the soil of the plaintiff's mining claims, laterally beyond the periphery of said dump or deposit and off of and
from said surface right, interest and estate of
defendant.
The United States District Court so interpreted the
decision of this court in the case of Utah Copper Com-
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parry vs. Montana-Bingham Consolidated Mining Company.
Counsel appear to attach great importance to the
following from the decision of this court:

"* * * Were the plaintiff attempting to
follow, collect and divert waters, though they
carry copper in solution, after they have left
the dump and percolating in and through the
soil and ground of the defendant not conveyed
to the plaintiff, the cited cases would be applicable, but that is not what the plaintiff seeks
to do. It may readily be conceded that waters,
though they carry copper or other minerals in
solution, which are suffered and permitted to
flow and escape from the dump and seep and
percolate through the soil and earth of the defendant's claims not conveyed to the plaintiff
and on or in which it has no surface or other
rights, are lost to the plaintiff and become the
:property of the defendant and may not be pursued or reclaimed or taken by the plaintiff.''
(255 Pac 675).
Had the plaintiff m the Tiewaukee case not acquired the right to occupy the surface beneath its dump
for the purpose for which it was in po·ssession, in other
words, had been a trespasser upon that surface, this
court would apparently have held, in accord with that
part of its opinion above quoted, that the copper solutions would have been lost to the plaintiff after they
had seeped or percolated into or upon the surface beneath the dump.

But the reason tho·se solutions were
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not lost to the plaintiff in that case was that plaintiff
was not a trespasser there, but instead had been granted
the right to use the surfwce for the purpose to which
plaintiff was then devoting it. Is not the situation the
same whether that right be acquired by contract or
condemnation?
In the case at bar the two estates are laterally contiguous, but the copper solutions nevertheless flow from
one to the other, from the plaintiff's estate to the premises of the defendant, as in the Tiewaukee case. Were
these solutions ",suffered and permitted (by plaintiff)
to flow and escape from the dump and seep and percolate through the soil and earth of the defendants' claim

*

*

* in which it has no surface or other rights,"

then under the decision of this court it might be reasonably argued that those solutious had been "lost to the
plaintiff and become the property of the defendants and
may not be pursued or reclaimed or taken by the plaintiff." But what do these defendants think this suit
is fod Not being able to acquire by contract the right
to convey these solutions over and upon the premises
of the defendants, plaintiff found it necessary to institute this suit by which to condemn that right, and,
pursuant to the order of court entered into possession
of that part of the defendants' premises required for
that purpose, and exercising the right so conferred upon
plaintiff in and upon those premises, plaintiff proceed-
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ed to and has at all times since under that right, conveyed its copper solutions from its dumps down to its
intake.

Plaintiff has not ''suffered and permitted'' its

copper solutions to "escape" and "seep and percolate
through the soil and earth of the defendants' claims

* * * on or in which it has no surface or other
rights," but instead plaintiff has done and is now doing
the only reasonable and practical thing plaintiff could
or can do whereby to prevent the ''escape'' of its
copper solutions and prevent their seizure by others
who have no right, title or interest in them.

In the

'Tiewaukee case and in that at bar the plaintiff's estate
was the upper estate, that of the defendants the lower.
In the Tiewaukee case the plaintiff's right to collect
and convey the waters upon and through the surface
was by contract,-in the case at bar by condemnation.
As this court permitted that collection, conveyance and
diver sion upon the lower estate where the right had its
origin in contract, so will this court protect this plain1

tiff in the conveyance, colle'Ction and diversion of its
property where plaintiff is in possession by order of
court made within its jurisdiction in the exercise of
rights conferred by the statutes and laws of this state
in aid of mining, in its each and every phase and aspect.
Plaintiff conclusively proved that all the copper solutions appearing at the so-called Hays Spring flow directly down the gulch from plaintiff's dumps above,
through the railroad fill, and plaintiff has accordingly
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conducted over and across Tract D not a drop of copper solution or water that does not originate in plaintiff's dumps or flow therefrom, and that every ounce
of copper contained in those solutions has been derived
from plaintiff's ores contained in plaintiff's dumps.
If we are correct in that such has been the proof in

this case, then the conclusion is irresistible that every
drop of those copper solutions that have appeared at
the so-called Hays Spring has been conducted by plaintiff across Tract D, either through the railroad fill or
along and upon bedrock, pursuant to the order of the
court below and plaintiff's right thereby. By the
court's order, plaintiff acquired the right to convey
plaintiff's copper solutions across Tract D and plaintiff
has been engaged in the conveyance of its copper solutions across that tract at all times since, pursuant to
that right acquired by that order.

Moreover, that

order and the right of plaintiff thereunder was confirmed by the judgment in this case and there was included in the judgment herein interest on the stipulated
amount from the date of the order putting plaintiff in
possession, the judgment by relation becoming effective
for that purpose as of the date of the order for immediate occupation. Plaintiff's title to these waters
under defendants' interpretation of the decision of this
court in Utah Copper Company vs. Montana-Bingham
Consolidated Mining Company, supra, would depend
upon plaintiff's acquisition of the right to convey those

73

waters across Tract D. Having acquired that right in
this suit by court order granting immediate occupation
for that purpose, confirmed by the judgment herein,
it cannot be said that plaintiff has ''suffered or permitted" those waters to "seep and percolate through the
on
soil and earth of the defendants' claims
*
or in which it has no surface or other rights." Therefore those solutions continued the property of the plaintiff, did not leave plaintiff's estate and did not become
the property of the defendants, and those solutions
have accordingly been kept constantly in the possession
of the plaintiff and constantly upon and within plaintiff's property pursuant to the easements hereby acquired.

(C)
Point
Defendants' law point number 3 relating to the stipulation for the order for immediate occupation-Appellants'
Brief, pages 67 to 103.

The above occupies a substantial part of appellants'
brief and is a remarkable discussion. Oounsel assigned
error upon the findings and conclusions, but direct the
greater part of their argument against the memorandum
of the court. We are not here concerned with what
might have been the plaintiff's liability had plaintiff
been denied the right to condemn the easements sought.
We have no intention of debating that question with
'Counsel, for neither finding nor conclusion can be found
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upon what might have been the liability of the parties
had the judgment been for the defendants instead of the
plaintiff.

In our opinion such is not within the scope

of this court's present inquiry.

When a court of com-

petent jurisdiction shall have adjudged that the copper
solutions plaintiff has received in its intake in Dixon
Gulch were the property of the defendants, then will
be time enough to discuss an accounting-we are not
now interested in matters of accounting.

The other

phase of that discussion, namely, counsel's defense that
the stipulation "without prejudice" and the court's
order for immediate occupation thereupon are ws though
neither stipulation nor order had been made at all, is
within the scope of this court's inquiry and

w~;

will

direct and limit our discussion accordingly.
We confess to considerable difficulty in comprehending counsel's conception of their stipulation and
its effect.

It must always have been apparent to coun-

sel that our only purpose in entering into that stipulation was for the court order for immediate occupation,
and that the only purpose for which that order could
have been made was to vest in plaintiff the right pending the action to enter into possession of the premises
sought to be condemned, and devote them to the uses
for which they were sought. rrhe defendants protected
themselves against loss in the event plaintiff were not
permitted to condemn by exacting from plaintiff a bond
in the amount of $10,000.00, and plaintiff complied with
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that condition, furnished the bond accordingly, the order
then being made as contemplated by the stipulation.
The result for which counsel now contend would be so
incongruous as to be ridiculous. It had not occurred to
either the court or ourselves that we were being imposed
upon.

Counsel should have had more regard for our

credulity.

Counsel should not have permitted us to

collect and divert those copper solutions ever since
June 13, 1928, and in our facilities to have precipitated
the copper from them and marketed it in the belief
that the court order gave us possession for that purpose
pending the action, only to inform us that all we had
done was for defendants' sole account, that the stipulation and order were always void because in our
credulity and ignorance we had so st1pulated. Counsel
argue that they had known it all the time, because they
had expressly so stipulated, and that because we contended and the court below held, that by the order resulting from the stipulation, the plaintiff had been put into
possession for all the purposes within the contemplation
of the suit and had continued therein pursuant to that
right to and including judgment, that we were "cute"
and "tricky," and guilty of "legal legerdemain,"''as cute, as tricky, a piece of legal legerdemain, as the
annals of the law disclose"! (Appellants' Brief, page
97.) In common with many members of the bench and
bar, we have received upon various occa:sions from one
of defendants' counsel bits of humor for which he has
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acquired a reputation, and it had occurred to us that
possibly in the writing of pages 67 to 103 of their brief
counsel had made a supreme effort of that character.
But the result does not do him justice.
Neither stipulation nor order has been prejudicial
to defendants on the trial-no more than are such orders
under the statutes and the decisions of this court.
The stipulation, however, was a consent to the making
of the order and the order gave to plaintiff the right
pending the action to occupy the premises and put them
to the uses for which plaintiff sought t,o condemn them.
By the judgment, that permission was confirmed, the
judgment included interest upon the amount from the
date of occupation under that order and plaintiff continues in possession of the premises accordingly.

We

do not now and never have claimed more for either
stipulation or order.

There was only one purpose for

which that order was or could have been made and that
was to vest in the plaintiff the right pending the action
to enter into the possession of the premises sought to
be condemned and devote them to the uses for which
they were sought. Counsel would have this court conelude that the parties made this stipulation, that plaintiff in

compliance with its requirements

had pur-

chased a bond with corporate surety in the amount of
$10,000.00, paid the annual premium of $100.00 thereupon year after year, and the court below had made
its order putting plaintiff into possession accordingly,
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all to no accomplishment whatever, that although both
stipulation and order expressly provided for the right
to enter into possession and use of the premises, and
the order in addition granted express injunctive relief
against hindrance or interference with that right, still
that all of that was meaningless and futile, that plaintiff was nevertheless a trespasser, because it provided
in the stipulation that it should be ''otherwise'' without
prejudice. Such an argument is worthy of no comment.
(D)
Point
The copper solutions flowing at the so-called Hays
Spring flow from plaintiff's dumps down Dixon Gulch in a
channel or course definitely known and positively defined,
and those copper solutions are not now and never were
percolating waters within the legal definition of such.

These copper solutions while in plaintiff's dumps
are the personal property of plaintiff, the very corpus
of which plaintiff owns, just as plaintiff owns the ores
and other material in its dump, Utah Copper Company
v. Montana-Bingham Consolidated Mining Company,
69 Utah at pages 430 and 431, where the court held:

* * * we are of the opinion that the
waters carrying copper or other minerals in solution, so long as they are in the dump and thus
a part of it, * * * are, like the dump itself,
the property of the plaintiff; that it is as lawful for the plaintiff, so long as the waters are
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in the dump, to collect and remove them as it
is to remove the dump itself; * * *
and such they continue to be as they percolate through
the natural soil upon the surface beneath the dump aml
thence along bedrock over a channel plaintiff occupie-;
by court order for that purpose to plaintiff's intake.
Their character is unchanged, the personal property vf
plaintiff always identified, never abandoned and never
have they become true percolating waters.
Title to such water while in plaintiff's dump before
processes of nature have converted it into the valuable
copper solution that defendants so much desire, is in
plaintiff, and after these natural processes have converted the water, the property of plaintiff, into a thing
of value in the form of a copper solution, by leaching
out and carrying in such solution the valuable copper
in plaintiff's dump, also the property of plaintiff, the
solution continues to be and is plaintiff's property. This
copper solution is an artificial product composed of ingredients all of which are the property of plaintiff.
That solution is a definite, definable and identified
substance from a known source, the property of plaintiff,
and as it falls upon the the surface beneath the dump,
trickles, seeps and flows on and above bedrock in the
bottom of the gulch over the channel plaintiff has
condemned across defendants' property, it is still such
definable, identified substance, tracea'ble
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and tratced

from such known source wherein it was the property
of plaintiff, wherein the copper was the property of
plaintiff, admitted to he such by defendants, the product of plaintiff's industry, mined by plaintiff, transported and deposited upon that dump by plaintiff and
now as plaintiff's property collected by plaintiff in its
intake and conveyed away to plaintiff's precipitating
plant, where the copper therein contained, plaintiff's
property, derived from plaintiff's dumps, is being preserved for plaintiff, its owner.
Particularly is title to these copper soultions in
the plaintiff, because plaintiff, pursuant to the order
of the court below is now and has been at all times
with which we are concerned conveying them from the
boundary line of plaintiff's premises over and across
the premises of defendants in a channel that is known
and defined, poRsession of which for that purpose has
been given plaintiff by the order for immediate occupation made by the court below, followed by the judgment
and final order of condemnation herein.
We find an interesting case in that of Los Angeles v.
Pomeroy 124 Cal. 597, 57 Pac. 585 (error dismissed
without passing upon merits in 188 U. S. 314, 47 L. Ed.
487, 63 L. R. A. 471, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 395).

In that

case the City of Los Angeles sought to condemn 315
acres of land that was saturated with water, at the
lower end of which it was proposed to construct a sub80

surface dam, thereby ra1smg the plane of saturation,
whereupon it was proposed to tap this heavily saturated bed of sand and gravel by means of a tunnel constructed with lateral galleries, through which the water
could be drained off and eonducted to the municipal
supply pipes. It was contended there was no authority
in law for the condemnation of that land for that purpose.

The court held, however, that the land was
* * * to be used as a reservoir, such as
essentially it is, and none the less so because the
water does not rise and stand above the surface. The evidence in the case shows that from
one-fifth to one-third of the entire bulk of the
material filling the valley below the plane of
saturation is water. The land in its natural
state, therefore, is a reservoir, and a subsurface
dam is to be constructed in order to make it
better serve the purposes of a reservoir. Such
being the usc to which it is to be devoted, the
fee simplr may he taken. Code Civ. Proc. § 1239;
St. 1891, p. 102.

That part of § 1239, Code of Civil Procedure, m
which we are interested is as follows:
The following is a classification of the
estates and rights in lands subject to be taken
for public use:
1. A FEE SrMPLE, when taken for public
buildings or grounds, or for permanent buildings,
for reservoirs and dams, and permanent flooding occasioned thereby, or for an outlet for a
flow, or a place for the deposit of debris or
tailings of a mine.
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That se'Ction was early enacted into the statutes
of Utah.

§ 7331, Compiled Laws of Utah, 1917, is

identical with the above except that in the Utah statute
there were added the following wordsmill, smelter or other place for thP reduction of
ores.
The Utah se1ction was amended in 1919 (Chapter
126 Laws of Utah 1919, page 846) when the following

proviso was added :

*

*

* provided,

that where
surface
ground is underlaid with minerals, coal or other
deposits sufficiently valuable to justify extraction, a perpetual casement may be taken for the
surface ground over such deposits.
By the decision in Los Angeles v. Pomeroy, supra,
"the land in its natural state therefore is a reservoir"
and is "none the less so because the water does not
rise and stand above the surface.''
The court in Los Angeles v. Pomeroy also defined
a ''subterranean stream'' as follows:

* * * it will be convenient to first dispose of the main question in the case, viz., the
proper definition of a subterranean stream.
There is no dispute between the parties, and no
conflict in the authorities, as to the proposition
that subterranean streams flowing through known
and definite channels are governecl by the same
rules that apply to surface streams. * * *
the law, as applicable to the present case, IS
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well eptiomized in section 48 of Kinney on Irrigation, as follows:
'Subterranean or underground water courses
are, as their names indicate, those water currents that flow under the surface of the earth.
* * * In and near the mountains many streams
have a bed which was originally a rocky canon,
but has been filled up with boulders and coarse
gravel. In this debris a large portion or all of
the water sinks from sight, to reappear only
when some rocky reef crosses the channel and
forces the water to the surface. 'l'he movement
of this water through the porous gravel, owing
to the declivity of the stream, is often quite rapid,
and a considerable volume may thus pass down
the channel hidden from sight. These water
courses are divided into two distinct classes,thosc whose channels arc known or defined, and
those unknown and undefined. * * * the word
'defined' means a contracted and bounded channel, * * * and the word 'known' refers to
knowledge of the course of the stream by reasonable inference. '* * ,,, '
In this case the
boundaries of the ehanncl and the existence and
course of the underground stream were unknown
and undefined, except so far as they could be inferred; but there was a great amount of evidence from which a reasonable inference could
be drawn that the channel was bounded and defined by the sloping sides of the Cahuenga and
Verdugo hills meeting underground, * * *
The trial court had given the following instruction,
which was approved by the supreme court of California:
(20)

If you find from the evidence that
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the lands sought to be condemned are situated
at the lower portion of, and form a part of,
the San J<~ernando basin or watershed, near or at
its outlet, and that said basin is abont twentyfour miles long and about twelve miles wide at
the widest point, and that said outlet is from
two thousand feet to three miles wide, and bounded and defined on the southern side by the rock
of the Cahuenga range, and on its northern side
by a similar rock of the Verdugo hills, and that
the earth of which the basin is geuerally composed, including said outlet and the land sought
to be condemned, is an alluvial or other deposit
made up of loam, sand, gravel, and boulders,
mixed together and interspersed \vith broken
or irregular strata or masses of clay or cemented
sand and gravel, and lying in place as originally
deposited by the forces of nature, and that as the
same lies in place the natural voids or interstices
of such earth generally throughout the basin,
including the defendants' lands and said outlet, are equal to from one-fifth to one-third of
the bulk of the entire mass, and that such entire
deposit lies upon a grade or slope towards and
through the outlet of such basin, and that all
the water falling in the watershed of such basin,
which is not lost in storm, run off, or by evaporation, or in supporting plant life, or held immovable in the ground, sinks into the earth
composing such basin, and thence by force of
gravity moves down through such voids or natural interstices of the earth throughout the
greater portion of the entire mass to the outlet
of the basin, through which it passes, * * *
if such water does collect underground and flow
in certain courses or channels through coarse,
permeable material therein, where the existence
and general course of the flowing or moving
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body of water can be easily determined, then
the water so moving in such channels would constitute a water course, although not visible on the
surface, and although the space through which
the channel extends may be largely filled with
the material through which the water flows. * * *
Counsel apparently are of the opinion that all waters
that percolate are percolating waters within the legal
definition, and that percolating waters do not "flow"
in defined and known channels, but there is nothing in
the cases counsel cites or in any others of which we are
aware that justifies such a conclusion. In the case
annotated it is said at page 1381 of 55 A. L. R. that
percolating waters

* * * may flow in a well-defined channel and
be such as, if on the surface, would answer the
description of a watercourse, but, in order to
be subject to the law of surface water, the existence, location, and flow of the water must
be known to the owner of the land through whie11
it flows, or it must be discoverable from the
surface of the earth. * * * Furthermore,
'the knowledge required * * * must be knowledge by reasona ble inference, from existing and
observed facts in the natural or rather preexisting condition of the surface of the ground.'
1

*

*

*

Upon the same page appears the following quotation from 27 R. C. L. at page 1170, § 90:
The distinction between rights in surface
and in subterranean streams is not founded on
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the fact of their location above or below ground,
but on the fact of knowledge, actual or acquirable, of their existence, location and course, and
the court's endeavor, so far as practicable, to
apply the rules of law applicable to surface
streams or bodies of water existing in well-defined channels to the like streams or bodies
existing underground.
See also Kinney on Irrigation and Water Rights
(2d ed.) Vol. 2 §§ 1155, 1156, at pages 2098 to 2101,
and Los Angeles v. Hunter, 105 Pac. 755, 156 Cal.
603.
These copper solutions flow down Dixon Gulch
through the railroad fill and come to the surface of,
from and out of the railroad fill, along a course and in
a channel thoroughly well-known and perfectly defined.
No one is interested whether or not in their flow within
this channel and along this well-known and defined
course they seep and percolate.

Mr. Goodrich was

quite accurate when he testified as follows:
I would say that Dixon Gulch is a well defined channel. * * * The entire gulch is a
well defined channel. I would say the waters
that come through the fill and find their way
into tract D come through in a well defined channel. The channel is all of tract D; they come
through everywhere in all of that area. During
the low season of the year I believe the particular
part of tract D where they came through is the
bottom of gulch, * * * they would also flow
through the drain tunnel. Except in the drain
tunnel and the bottom of the gulch they would

SG

not come through any other place at low water
season in commercial quantities. ('l'r. :329) * * *
I say that in low water a flow like it is now that
substantially all of the water will come through
the drain tunnel or come down underneath and
flow into the old channel of Dixon Gulch; it will
come down the bottom of the gulch. (Tr. 330)

• • •

At the outset in the trial of this case, in the course
of counsel's argument upon defendants' motion for a
non-suit, it was the defendants' theory that plaintiff
could "condemn a right through our land so that they
may go up into their lands and collect their water.
'rhat is all right; they can do that;" (Tr. 700) But the
only difference between that and what the plaintiff is
doing in this case is that by the course counsel suggest, plaintiff would have conveyed a part at least of
its copper solutions over and across the defendants'
lands along on top of bedrock in an artificial channel
the plaintiff at great risk and expense would have
cleared beneath the railway fill, just as plaintiff proposed to do with relation to its Tiewaukee dump. The
solutions would then have flowed in the same channel
as those on bedrock in the bottom of Dixon Gulch, if
any, now o,ccupy. We do not understand that the fact
that plaintiff had driven a tunnel on bedrock up beneath the fill for these waters would bring the plaintiff's
effort within the statute, but that otherwise, regardless
of the public use to which the tract were devoted, title
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to those waters would nevertheless vest in the defendants under the law applicable to surface waters.

The

statute does not require the condemner as a condition
precedent to condemnation to clear the channel and
then by a condition subsequent forfeit the right acquired when the channel shall contain large boulders.
What the cleaning of the channel has to do with plaintiff's right to condemn, so long as the channel shall be
put to the uses within the contemplation of the statute,

It can be of no
importance whether the channel were artificial or as
nature made it, under the authorities it makes not the
slightest difference that this ditch shall have been filled
up to the top of the mountains by the railroad fill, if,
notwithstanding, it shall still serve the purpose of a
ditch, shall still be devoted to the uses for which the
statute authorizes the exercise of the right of eminent
domain. In Los Angeles v. Pomeroy, supra, the pass
between the Oahuenga range and the Verdugo hiUs
was on the surface from one and one-half to two and
one-half miles in width, ''and that in its borings have
been made over 100 feet in depth before encountering
bedrock.'' But the court held:
is quite beyond our comprehension.

but here is not only water moving in a definite
direction, but also sides and bed to the channel
in which it is moving, and these, also, are comprehended in the court's definition of a subterranean stream.
Is this narrow channel in the bottom of Dixon
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Gulch, occupying as it does the whole of Tract D, any
less known and defined'?
The copper solutions

that pass from plaintiff's

dumps to its intake through the railroad fill never become the property of the defendants because never upon,
within or a part of defendants' estate.

Copper solu-

tions that at some time in their course to plaintiff's intake flow upon bedrock or upon the natural surface soil
of the defendants' premises beneath the fill, or through
the railroad fill, flow in a known and defined channel
identified by the precipitous walls of the gulch and its
bedrock bottom, and well known, a channel not only so
definitely known and positively defined, but one that
is in the possession of plaintiff pursuant to court order
for immediate occupation and the suc,ceeding judgment,
and is being devoted by plaintiff to plaintiff's use for
the pul'!poses for which plaintiff seeks to condemn it,
purposes within the express provisions of the statutes
authorizing the exercise of the power of eminent domain.
(E)
Point
Plaintiff possesses the power to condemn Tract D for
the purposes alleged.

Tract D is sought in its natural state for a natural
outlet for the copper waters flowing from plaintiff's
dumps in Dixon Gulch, out of which mineral deposit
there is constantly being leached plaintiff's copper con-
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tained in plaintiff's ores that compose those dumps,
whi,ch copper is carried in solution down Dixon Gulch
to the intake for which plaintiff seeks to condemn Tract
C.

'_l1raet D is sought in its natural state for a ditch,

flume, aqueduct or conduit to facilitate the reduction
of ores and the working of this mineral deposit consisting of plaintiff's dumps in Dixon Gulch.

It is of

course conceded that plaintiff is the owner of these
dumps and of all copper solutions while in the dumps
and while in or on plaintiff's land upon which the
dumps have been deposited.

Plaintiff is the owner of

the whole drainage area of Dixon Gulch down to the
tboundary line of the Valentine Scrip. Tract D lies
in the bottom of the gulch at its narrowest point, which
is upon the Valentine Scrip. The right plaintiff seeks
to condemn therefore is merely that to convey copper
solutions, conceded to be plaintiff's property at the
Valentine Scrip boundary, across a part of the Valentine Scrip to plaintiff's intake, where they are being
and will be collected and conveyed thence to plaintiff's
precipitating plant, where plaintiff's copper is recovered from plaintiff's copper waters and disposed of by
plaintiff.
Plaintiff's right to take Tracts A, B, C and G for
the respeetive purposes pleaded not being resisted, this
appeal is concerned with Tract D only, i. e., with plaintiff's effort to condemn Tract D in its natural state for
a natural outlet for the copper waters flowing from the
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plaintiff's dumps in Dixon Gulch and for a ditch, flume,
aqueduct or conduit to facilitate the reduction of ores
in, and the working of plaintiff's mineral deposit cousisting of, plaintiff's dumps in Dixon Gulch. There are
constantly in operation in those dumps forces accomplishing the gradual leaching of plaintiff's copper from
plaintiff's ores there deposited and the carrying away
in solution of plaintiff's copper so leached from plaintiff's ores, the dumps yielding a steady stream of copper waters that flow down the gulch and through the
railroad fill of the Bingham & Garfield Railroad. Unless plaintiff be permitted to recover its property as
plaintiff proposes, plaintiff's copper solutions will flow
thence on down into Bingham Creek and to waste, or
into the possession of others who, like the defendants
in this case, neither own them nor have any right, title
or interest in them.
By order of the court below on June 13, 1928, made
upon the stipulation of the parties hereinbefore discussed, plaintiff entered into possession of Tract D
and the remainder of the premises sought to be condemned, constructed plaintiff's diversion facilities and
thereafter diverted those waters to plaintiff's precipitating plant, where their copper content has since been
and is being precipitated.

The defendants are not in

possession of the surface area within Tract D, nor have
they been since 1910 when by the conveyances and condemnation decree hereinbefore mentioned the railway
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company acquired its railroad easements. The occupation of the Bingham & Garfield Railway Company is
from the nature of its use exclusive, and has continued
so since these conveyances and the condemnation decree.
Has the plaintiff in this action the right to condemn Tract D for the purposes stated? That is the
only question this court is called upon to determined.
Plaintiff derives its right to exercise the power of
eminent domain by virtue of Chapter 65, Compiled Laws
of Utah 1917, and by that act and its predecessor acts
from which it was evolved, mining generally in the State
of Utah was declared to be a public use in aid of which
private individuals and private corporations may exercise the power of eminent domain. That it was the
intention of the legislature by these statutes to declare
mining generally a public use in the State of Utah is
apparent from a reading of § 7330. The enumeration
contained in that section with relation to mining includes
every mining activity of which the most fertile imagination ,could conceive. While the purpose for which plaintiff here seeks to condemn Tract D is expressly within
that enumeration, still, were that not the fact, the purpose for which plaintiff now seeks to condemn Tract
D being in furtherance of plaintiff's mining operations,
plaintiff would under this statute possess the power to
condemn as herein prayed, because mining generally in
this state is the public use in aid of which that power
has been granted by the statute.
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It may happen some .day that a situation will arise
in the conduct of mining operations in this state in one
of their many aspects that a mining company may find
it necessary to exercise the power of eminent domain
for a use not precisely designated <by the statute, but
necessary to the recovery or preservation of its property, hence in furtherance of its mining operations. A
mining company may, for instance, find a neighbor bent
upon seizing its property, the latter occupying a position
from which the mining company if denied the right
of eminent domain must suffer the neighbor's continued
appropriation of the mining company's property, this
for no other reason than that the then state of the law
afforded the owner of the property no relief, but when
that time shall come, mining generally in the state of
Utah will of course be again declared to be the public
use in aid of which the power of eminent domain may
be exercised, and that although the precise purpose for
which it shall then have become necessary to exercise
the power be not expressly enumerated in the statute,
the courts will hold that mining being the use for the
furtherance of which the power was granted, mining
will be the justification for its exercise, whether or not
the precise purpose then served be included in the
statutory enumeration.
It is be,cause the mining industry in the State of
Utah is of such vital concern to its people, so eBsential
to the public welfare, that those engaged in that in93

dustry have been endowed by the statute with the power
of eminent domain when exercised in furtherance of the
mining industry. Highland Boy Gold M. Co. v. Strickley, 28 Utah 215, 78 Pac. 296. Affirmed 200 U. S. 525.
Should it become necessary to the efficient conduct of
any phase of one's mining operations to acquire an
easement over a tract of land for use in its natural
state as a canal whereby water might be conveyed for
that use, are the courts to microscopically scrutinize
the enumeration contained in § 7330 and deny the right
merely because by definition a canal is a thing artificial,
not as nature made it, that the power might be exercised for the construction of a canal but not to condemn the land in its natural state to serve as such, this
for no better reason than that the enumeration did
not include the appropriation of land in its natural state
for that purpose?

Are considerations of public wel-

fare served if the channel be an artificial one, but not
served if the channel be as nature made it? Such reasonmg is nonsense.
It is said m Highland Boy Gold M. Co. v. Strick-

ley, supra:

* * * The mining industry in this state,
and in others similarly situated, not only produces a home market for products of the farm,
and furnishes thousands of men with steady employment at liberal and remunerative wages, but
also produces wealth which has enabled other
industries to be created and to flourish, which,
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without the stimulus thus furnished, would languish. * * * We have in this state in addition to the extensive deposits of gold, silver, lead,
and copper ores, large areas of lands containing
'Coal in almost limitless quantities, and we depend almost exclusively upon the coal mines for
the fuel used in our manufacturing establishments
and for domestic purposes. Now, it is of vital
importance to the people that the coal, as well as
the other hidden resources of the state, be opened
up and developed, and that the mining industry
in general, which has been the source of so much
wealth to the people of this and other Western
states, be conducted on the same extensive scale
in the future that has characterized its operations
in the past. Therefore the public policy of the
state, as exemplified by the act of the Legislature under consideration, is to encourage the
people to open up and exploit the mines with
which the state abounds, and thereby not only
give to the state the wealth which will enable other
industries to be created, but furnish thousands
of laborers with remunerative employment.
In a later decision, this time in Monetaire M. Co.
v. Columbus Rexall Oonsol. M. Co., 53 Utah 413, 174
Pac. 172, the supreme court of this state again similarly
declared itself, that time as follows:
Mr. Lindley, in discussing the right of eminent domain as applied to mining, in his excellent
work on Mines, in volume 1 (3d ed.) p. 612 says:

'It is manifest, however, that there is a
marked tendency, evolutionary in its nature, to
break away from the old rigid rules on the subject
of 'public use,' and to enlarge the definition of the
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term, so as to make it synonymous with 'public
welfare.' This tendency is no doubt influenced to
some extent by the growth and spread of sociological ideas which seck to influence the construction of constitutions and statutes in the it:tercst of the group instead of the individual, and
to authorize the condemnation of private property
for any use which stimulates or encourages the
development of the natural resources of the country. * * * But the test of 'public welfare'
instead of the old doctrine of 'public usc' is being
gradually extended, with the promise of its becoming the prevailing doctrine in most jurisdictions.'
And then the court concluded:
It is too late now to insist thai the people
of both the state and nation are not interested
in and benefited by the development of the mineral resources and wealth of both the state and
the nation. The people are likewise interested
in having the mineral resources developed at as
little cost and expense as possible, since in no
other way can the ores of the lower grades be
developed and mined.

We do not serve public welfare, considerations of
which gave birth to the eminent domain statute, by
quibbling over the definition of words employed in the
enumeration in § 7330, by shutting our eyes to the purpose served and de:ciding that land may be condemned
for a canal artificially to be constructed, but that land
in its natural state might not be condemned, although
for precisely the same usc.
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That would be absurd.

In the case at bar the precise situation suggested
m Highland Boy Gold M. Co. v. Strickley, supra, does
not arise.

We do not have a neighbor who seeks an

exorbitant payment for a right of way over his property.
We go one step further in this case; here the plaintiff
has a neighbor who has concluded that if he can block
plaintiff's attempt to divert and preserve plaintiff's
copper solutions from plaintiff's dumps, those solutions
will become his property; he argues that after the solutions have passed from plaintiff's land over the boundary line and upon defendant's property, title has passed
to defendant, this although by court order plaintiff has
been given permission to carry its copper solutions
from its property so over and across the property
of defendants.

Therefore the defendants insist that,

the solutions being theirs, defendants are entitled to a
judgment of some hundreds of thousands of dollars if
plaintiff he permitted to condemn and so appropriate
these copper waters, but that plaintiff should not be
permitted to condemn because the solutions belong to
defendants, and defendants can precipitate from them
their copper content as well as can plaintiff, thus putting them to the same public use.

In all this the de-

fendants admit title to these copper solutions in plaintiff whil~ upon plaintiff's land, and defendants further
concede that had plaintiff sought to condemn an easement for a tunnel or other artificial canal through defendants' property, through which to divert the cop-
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per solutions, the solutions although running along this

artificial canal across defendants' property would continue plaintiff's property, would not become the property of defendants-in other words, if the canal be
artificial, title to the copper solutions will not pass to
the defendants, but if the course be over the ground
in its natural state, title will pass to the defendants,
notwithstanding the fact that plaintiff is taking its
water over the latter course by the order of this court
putting plaintiff in possession for that purpose, and
even notwithstanding in this proceeding plaintiff permanently acquire the right by the actual condemnation
of that natural water course, ditch, outlet or whatever
it may be called. That method of reasoning is indeed
fantastic; were it to be generally indulged neither
property rights nor one's intellectual equilibrium could
survive, to say nothing of the public welfare.
Mining generally in the State of Utah is the public
use in aid of which the exercise by the plaintiff of the
right of eminent domain may be justified, mining
generally, not certain of its incidents, but all of them.
That is apparent from the statute and the statute has
been so interpreted by this court. In Monetaire M. Co.
v. Columbus Rexall Consol. M. Co., supra, the court
held:

* * * In examining all of the subdivisions
of section 3588 (§ 7330 Comp. L. HH7) and of
section 3590, one becomes convinced that it was
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the intention of the legislative power of this
state to declare mining generally and the development of mines and mineral deposits a public
use, in furtherance of which the right of the exercise of eminent domain was applied with full
force and effeet. This is apparent from the
first enactment of the law of eminent domain as
found in Laws Utah 1884, tit. 7, p. 348. Section
3588 has been amended and extended in some
particulars ever since title 7 of 1884 was enacted.
Not only did the court in that case hold that in
this state mining generally was the public use in aid of
which the right of eminent domain could be exercised,
but that such use having been by the statute declared
a public use, the statute must be given a broad and
liberal interpretation in its application to that use and
the exercise of the power of eminent domain with relation thereto. The court held:
The intention of the Legislature to extend
the right of eminent domain to mines and mining
being clear and unequivo'cal, what is the rule
respecting the construction and application that
should he given to the acts of the Legislature
in granting the right of eminent domain for thr~
uses and purposes contemplated in the Act? "" "" ·~
We think it is generally agreed that where
the right of eminent domain is granted for a
particular purpose, then the statute must be
given a liberal construction in furtherance of
such purpose. Our statute, in clear and explic:t
terms, grants the right of eminent domain for
the purpose of developing the mining industry
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and for the purpose of developing the mineral
resources of the state, regardless of ownership.
Under those circumstances, therefore, the rule
of construction that is applied by Mr. J m;tice
Hawley in the case of Douglas v. Byrnes (C. C.)
59 Fed. 28, 8hould be applied. Mr. Justice Hawley, in passing upon the eminent domain act of
the State of Nevada respecting the development
of mines (C. C.) 59 Fed. at page :n, says:
'The power of the Legislature, having
been fully recognized and sanctioned, the
purpose of the act should not ht~ hampered
by any narrow or technical objections.
The importance of encouraging the mining
industry of this state must be kept in view.
This was the object, intent, and purpose
of the Legislature in passing the act, and
its wisdom, policy, and expediency was
thereby determined. A reasonable, fair,
just, broad, and liberal view should be
taken by the court in interpreting ib provisions.'
The purpose for which plaintiff here seeks to condemn Tract D is expressly within the enumeration in
§ 7330.

Eliminating from this section what obviously

does not apply to plaintiff's effort here, carefully preserving each provision without distortion, we will have
the follownig:
7330. (G588). Exercised in behalf of what
uses. Subject to the provisions of this ehapter,
the right of eminent domain may be exorcised in
behalf of the following public uses:
2. * * all public uses authorized by the
legislature;

* * *
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5. * * * canals, ditches, flumes, tunnels,
aqueducts, and pipes for the supplying * *
mines, mills, smelters, or other works for the reduction of ores with water * * *
6.

*

*

*

tunnels, ditches, flumes, pipes,

* * * to facilitate the milling, * * or other
reduction of ores, or the working of mines, * * *
or mineral deposits; outlets, natural or otherwise, for * * water from mills, * * or
other works for the reduction of ores; or from
mines, * * or mineral deposits; * * also
any occupancy in common by the owners or possessors of different mines, * * * mineral deposits, mills, * * * or other places for the
reduction of ores, or any place for the flow, deposit, or conduct of tailings or refuse matter;

• • •
We are at once confronted by the express designation in paragraph 6 of § · 7330 of "outlets, natural or
otherwise, for * * * water from mills * * * or
other works for the reduction of ores; or from mmes

* * * or mineral deposits;'' and that is sufficiently
precise and explicit to afford plaintiff abundant authority for its condemnation of 'rract D for use as herein
specified, although an express provision of the statute
were required and the statute had not been judicially
construed as we have indicated. If there ever were a
natural outlet for the waters from a mineral deposit
Tract D is such an outlet for the copper waters from
plaintiff's copper ore dumps or mineral deposit in
Dixon Gulch. It does not require a stretch of the
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imagination to construe as "works for the reduction
of ores" plaintiff's dumps in Dixon Gulch, where the
ores have been deposited and are there being exposed
to the oxidixing influences of the air and meteoric waters and thus induced to surrender their copper content
in the form of copper solutions that flow over and across
Tract D, a natural outlet.
Plaintiff's precipitating plant near the mouth of
Bingham Canyon, to which all of these copper waters
are conveyed and where their copper content is precipitated, comes within the definition of "works for the reduction of ores."

Therein water is necessary, for the

copper cannot be leached from the ores in plaintiff's
dumps or mineral deposit except through the medium of
water, cannot be conveyed from those dumps or that
mineral deposit except through the medium of water,
which picks up and conveys the copper in solution from
the dumps or mineral deposit over and across Tract
D, the natural outlet, and thence to plaintiff's precipitating plant, where one phase of the process of reduction is concluded. Therefore the plaintiff is within the
express provision of paragraph 5 of the enumeration
contained in § 7330, whereby it is enacted that condemnation may be had for

* * * canals, ditches, flumes, tunnels, aqueducts, and pipes for the supplying * * mines, mills,
smelters, or other works for the reduction of
ores with water * *
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Paragraph 6 of § 7330 includes m its express
enumerationtunnels, ditches, flumes, p1pes * * * to facilitate the milling * * * or other reduction
of ores, or the working of mines * * * or
mineral deposits;
The condemnation of Tract D is "to facilitate the
reduction of ores" and the "working of a mineral
deposit''; it is a necessary link in the process, first,
of oxidation and leaching, and secondly, in that of precipitation, all of which are necessary to the recovery
from plaintiff's ores or mineral deposit of their copper content.
But counsel argue that the plaintiff does not come
within these provisions of the statute because there
neither is nor will be a ditch, flume or conduit across
Tmct D, counsel assuming that the ground in its natural state could not become a ditch, flume or conduit.
In Bouvier's Law Dictionary (Rawle's Revision)
Vol. 1, page 591, we find the following definition of the
word ditch:
DrTcH. The words 'd]tch' and 'drain' have
no technical or exact meaning. They both may
mean a hollow place in the g-round, natural or
artificial, where water is collected or passes off.
5 Gray 64.

and in 14 Cyc. 552, the following:
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DITCH. * * * A hollow space in the ground,
natural or artificial, where water is collected or
passes off.

In Smith v. Hampshire, 4 Cal. App. 8, 87 Pac.
224, which was a case involving an asserted right by
prescriptive use to the continued use of an artifically
excavated ditch for the conveyance of water for irrigation, the court defined a ditch as "no more than a
right of way for the passage of water.''
Sherrod v. Battle, 154 N. C. 345, 70 S. E. 834, was
a case to define a boundary by the following description contained in a deed:
Beginning at the head of a ditch on the Enfield and Tarboro Road, about equidistant from
the buildings on the land of J. H. Cutchin and
(those on) the Nevill place, running with said
ditch in an eastern direction to a branch; thence
with said branch to the edge of Griffin Swamp;
thence due east to the canal; and thence by
various calls to the beginning.
There was more than one ditch and the facts called
for a definition of the word "ditch." The court defined
the term as follows:
Tho words 'ditch' or 'urain have no technical
or exact meaning. They both may mean a hollow
or open space in the ground, natural or artificial,
where water is collected or passes off * * *
quoting from Goldthwaite v. East Bridgewater, 71 Mass.
( 5 Gray) 61.

104

In Sefton v. Prentice, 103 Cal. 670, 37 Pac. 641,
at 642, the court defined the terms with which we are
here concerned as follows:
'Conduit' is a general word, which applies
to any channel or structure by which flowing
water ·can be conducted from one point to another. It includes a ditch, flume, pipe, or any
kind of aqueduct.
'fhe case of Ange & Forest v. Atlantic Coast Line

R. Co., 159 N. C. 547, 75 S E. 796, was one requiring
a definition of the word "canal" as used in the statute,
and the court held that as there used ''the term 'ditch'
and 'canal' is used indiscriminately to designate an
artificial drain.''

The court then continued:

In the ordinary acceptation of the terms,
both indicate a channel constructed for the purpose of conveying water, tho only difference being that the word 'canal' suggests a channel of
larger dimensions than does the word .'ditch,' but
as defined by the authorities a ditch may be
natural or artificial * * * while a canal is
an artificial trench for confining water to a
defined channel * * * or a trench or excavation in the earth for conducting water and confining it to narrow limits * * *
We find the word "aqueduct" defined in the Century Dictionary as follows:
1. A conduit or channel for conducting
water from one place to another.
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In Webster's New International Dictionary, 1918,
the word "conduit" 1s defined as follows :
1. * * * a natural channel or passage
•for 1conveying water * * * an aqueduct,
canal or channel;

The court below disposed of this question m the
following convinoing manner:
The other question is whether, assuming
the facts to be as hereinbefore indicated, 'rract
D is subject, nevertheless, to condemnation. The
eourt concludes that in view of its finding relative to the source and course of the copper
waters, it is.
The tmct is subject to condemnation under
the law, in the opinion of the court, as "A natural
outlet for water from works for the reduction of
ores," or as "A natural outlet from a mineral
deposit." Just as the copper solution is water
for the purpose of applying the law of water
thereto so it is water in considering whether the
statute may be construed as including it in the
foregoing quoted phrases, even though plaintiff
is seeking an outlet from the dump for the purpose of conveying it and using it elsewhere
rather than to get rid of it. The dump is either
a mineral deposit or it constitutes an essential
part of the works for the reduction of ore. The
fact that the water used in one of the steps in
its reduction is that which adventitiously falls
thereon, rather than water turned on or poured
on the dump would make no difference. Water
from placer mining operations doubtless would
come within such provision of the statute. If it
would, then it would seem that water flowing
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from the dump in question, if such water were
poured from a bose or turned from another
source thereon would, and it seems to the court
that the artificial application of the water should
make no diff ereuce. ( Abs. 593-4).
(F)
Point

The taking is necessary to the use.

This court very clearly defines "necessity" with
relation to this subject in Postal Telegraph Cable Co.
v. Oregon Short Line Railway Company,

~3

Utah 474,

at 484-5, as follows:
It is also argued that no necessity has been
shown to exist for the taking of the right of
way. But it is shown that the respondent made
a bona fide effort to agree with the appellant
upon terms for the taking of the land sought,
and that the latter refused to consider respondent's proposition or to negotiate with it at all.
The necessity, therefore, exists for the taking.
It is not a question whether there is other land
to be had that is equally available, but the question is whether the land sought is needed for the
construction of the public work. The necessity
is shown to exist when it appears that it is necessary to take the land by condemnation proceedings in order to effectuate the purposes of the
corporation. * * * The respondent has the
right to determine when and where its telegraph
line shall be built. It may be said to be a general rule that, unless a corporation exercising
the power of eminent domain acts in bad faith
or is guilty of oppression, its discretion in the
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sele-ction of land will not be interfered with.
* * * With the degree of necessity or the extent which the property will advance the public
purpose, the courts have nothing to do. * * *
When the use is public, the necessity of expediency of appropriating any particular property is not a subject of judicial cognizance. * * *
The rule is similarly stated in 20 Corpus Juris
632, as follows:

* * * the grantee of the power, in the
absence of legislative restriction, may determine
the location of the land required, and such determination will not be interfered with by the
courts if it is made in good faith and is not
caprieious or wantonly injurious * * * The
landowner ·cannot raise the objection that there
is no necessity for condemning his property because some other location might be made, or some
other property obtained which would be more
suitaJble.
and counsel upon the oecasion of their argument of defendant's motion for non-suit (Tr. 747) admitted that
the rule as to necessity was correctly stated in Goldfield Consol. M. & T. Co. v. Old Sandstrom A. G. Min.
Co., 38 Nev. 426, 150 Pac. 313 and 318, as follows:
The rule as to what is 'necessary' in condemnation proceedings was clearly stated by this
court in the case of Overman S. M. Co. v. Cor·coran, 15 Nev. 147, where it is said:
'Individuals, by securing a title to
the barren lands adjacent to the mines,
mills, or works, have it within their power,
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by unreasonably refusing to part with
their lands for a just and fair compensation, which capital is always willing to
give without litigation, to greatly embarrass, if not entirely defeat, the business
of mining in such localities, and confirms
the opinion there advanced that 'the mineral wealth of this state ought not to be
left undeveloped for the want of any
quantity of land actually necessary to enable the owner or owners of mines to conduct and carry on the business of mining.'
The law does not contemplate that an
'absolute necessity' should exist for the
identical lands sought to be condemned.
The selection of any site for the purposes
specified must necessarily, to some extent, be arbitrary.'
This rule is sustained by the great weight
of authority. * * *
The contention that the land cannot be
condemned because there are other lands further
away that are available for the purpose sought
is of no force. * * *
It is the general rule that, when a corporation seeks to exercise the right of eminent
domain, its discretion in the selection of land
for its use will not be questioned where it acts
m goocl faith and not capriciously. * * *

If such were not the rule, the same defense
could be made with regard to any lands plaintiff might seek to condemn. We are clearly
of the opinion that a necessity ~was shown by respondent for the condemnation of the land.
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The defendants are not inconvenienced by the takmg (judgment, Abs. 673 to 675, final order, Abs. 682
to 684).

The defendants are of course devoting the

premises to no use whatever, nor have they any use
for them except this, that they would like to collect and
appropriate on rrract D plaintiff's copper solutions from
plaintiff's dumps in Dixon Gulch if they can succeed
in blocking plaintiff's effort to do so. Plaintiff does
not seek to disturb the premises in any manner; every
right is reserved to defendants except the right in plaintiff to preserve plaintiff's own property for plaintiff's
own use, and the Bingham & Garfield Railway Company
is in the exclusive possession of the premises anyway.
Attention is directed to the following provisions of the
final order of condemnation, which are repeated from
the judgment:

It is hereby further Ordered, Adjudged and
Decreed:
That plaintiff shall acquire by said taking
only the rights and easements herein defined,
and shall not acquire thereby either claim, righf,
or interest, ownership or trtle in or to any ore'>,
minerals, waters or other values that may be
beneath the top of bed-rock beneath said tracts,
or any right of subjacent or subsurface support.
That defendant Stephen Hays Estate, Inc.,
shall retain the right in good faith to prospect
for, mine and remove such orcs, minerals, waters,
or other values as said defendant shall encounter
beneath the top of bed-rock beneath the tracts
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hereby condemned except Tract C, and therein
beneath plaintiffs catchment facilities, and in
the course of said mining operations to dump
upon the surface of all or any of said Tracts
A, B, C and D whenever and wherever said mining operations shall reasonably require, provided,
however, that, before any material shall be
dumped upon said tracts, or any of them, or any
other or different use be made thereof, said defendant Stephen Hays Estate, Inc., shall have
given plaintiff thirty days' notice in writing of
such intention, and of the character of use to
which said premises shall be so subjected, and
thereupow p,laintiff shall have the right and
privilege at plaintiff's expense of relocating and
reconstructing plaintiff's facilities affected thereby to and upon such other unoccupied tracts of
land, if any there may be, owned by defendants,
or any of them, from which no interference shall
result with the said operations of said defendant
Stephen Hays Estate, Inc. If the waters or
solutions on or upwards from the top of bedrock, or any part of such waters or solutions,
shall be intercepted by reason, or in the course,
of mining operations, plaintiff shall have the
right to enter such mine workings and therefrom, or by such other method as shall be suitalble, repair bed-rock to the end or extent that
its condition shall be re-es,tablished substantially
as that in which it presently exists, or by any
other method continue the collection and diversion of the waters and solutions on top of bedrock. Defendant Stephen Hays Estate, Inc., shall
retain the further right to make any other use
of the tracts of land hereby condemned consistent
with the use thereof for which said tracts are
hereby acquired.
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What plaintiff seeks to acquire is of nominal value
only and no damage can result to defendants, so the
defendants stipulated that the value of the premises
condemned, together with the damage to result to the
balance of defendants' proper'ty by reason of the taking, was the nominal sum of $500.00, defendants excluding the copper waters, title to which they claimed.
~'he

substituted diversion facilities defendants pro-

pose are not only prohibitive in expense, but wholly
impractical and generally unsatisfactory.

The evidence

discloses that always in the collection and diversion of
the copper solutions from plaintiff's dumps the intakes
are constructed from beneath bedrock, thence by raises
through bedrock into or just below the toe of the dump
the solution from which is desired.
wa~ter

The quantity of

encountered immediately upon bedrock varies ac-

cording to the character of the soil or material on bedwck at the intake.

In Dixon Gulch at plaintiff's in-

take on Tract C very little of the solutions were obtained immediately on bedrock (Tr. 39, 104) because
the ma!terial at that point was capable of being so compressed by the weight of the railroad fill above that
it became relatively impervious.

The testimony con-

tains many examples of like occurrences beneath other
dumps. Nevertheless, to be ~:mre that all the copper
solutions are obtained, the intakes are constructed from
beneath bedrock to and through the top of bedrock,
intercepting the solutions on the top of bedrock and
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upwards.

The evidence in this case discloses not a

single instance wherein any part of the copper solutions sought were beneath the top of bedrock.
The face of the tunnel or intake proposed by the
defendant:,; is on the Gardelli placer gravels up Dixon
Gulch from the railroad fill, and those placer gravels
were described by Mr. Earl as follows:

* * * 'rhe rocks in those placer gravels
would be from, oh, I have seen rocks there from
three feet long, a foot and a half in diameter,
many of them; there are a lot of rocks that were
around six or eight inche:,; in diameter, lots of
them; I have :,;een many rock:,; there that old
man Gardelli couldn't lift, and he was a very
strong man. (Tr. 24:28) That is not unusual.
There are a lot of those down an old stream bed.
I would say ;)0 or 40 per cent of the placer
dump was compo:,;ed of rocks larger than six
inches in diameter, * * *

Mr. Christensen similarly described those gravels.
( Tr. 2100-2103)
Defendants' proposal
hibit 61.

IS

illustrated by their Ex-

It does not contemplate the collection of

waters at plaintiff's property line, but instead placing
the portal of a proposed tunnel at plaintiff's property
line and collecting the waters four hundred and thirty
feet or more up the gulch within plaintiff's property.
The defendants' witness Crocker sponsored this proposal.

The face of the tunnel as illustrated upon Ex113

hibit 61 is at the bottom of plaintiff's dump but on the
placer gravels.

Mr. Crocker testified that there was

deep wash there, how deep he did not know.

* * * whether it be twenty or thirty feet
or more; I should judge it was quite deep. In
places it might be more than thirty feet. (Tr.
1395) * * * The gulch widens a little at that
point so I don't know whether the thickness at
that point would be thirty or forty feet. I have
no judgment about it. As to my assuming in
our Exhibit 61 that bedrock lay within ten feet
of the natural surface in the bottom of the gulch,
I did not definitely assume tha!t bedrock lay anywhere at that point. (Tr. 1396) * * * I intended to show on Exhibit 61 this proposed tunnel of ours in red as being throughout its course
in bedrock. I don't know whether bedrock was
there or thirty feet below there. * * * Supposing that the present face of our tunnel as
I project it lies thirty feet above bedrock, I
could not say how far I would expect to continue
it in order to intercept these waters on bedrock.
(Tr. 1400)
The plaintiff's mine engineer, 1\fr. Earl, testified
as follows with relation to the defendants' proposal:
Referring to the testimony of defendant's
witness Crocker and his exhibit in that relation,
exhibit 61, by which he attempted to suggest
another method of collecting these waters this
time on the property line of the Utah Copper
'Company rather than down in the bottom of
the gulch, as to whether or not that was a reasonable practical method of collecting and diverting
these copper waters,-it is not. (Tr. 2272) I
might state first my understanding of Mr. Crock114

er 's testimony did not involve the collecting of
water on the Utah Copper boundary line or property line. Mr. Crocker's testimony as I remember it was that he was going up above the railroad fill and collect the water; that \vould be
some 200 or 300 feet westerly of the property
line. The exhibit shows that. (Tr. :2273) To
begin with, the plan as outlined on exhibit 61 as
'testified to by Mr. Crocker would not collect all
of the waters that came from the dump of the Utah
Copper Oompany, * * * therefore in my
opinion it would not be feasible from that standpoint. The reasons it would not collect all of
the water are that it is not at the toe of the
Utah Copper dump, it is underneath the dump
some distance. (Tr. 2275) And furthermore,
the plan as shown goes about seven or eight feet
below the bottom of the Dixon Gulch at that
point. It is my opinion that the gravels are much
deeper than that at that point, and it would
be necessary to go considerable depth to shut
off the water. That if a shut-off were attempted
at that point it would be necessary to put in
considerable concrete or some other such construction in order to dam up the water and back
it up to go into this tunnel.
I also believe that the water is spread out
over considerable area at that point and it would
be necessary to extend the wings way up on the
side hill, cutting through all of the placer gravels,
cutting through the banks of the Bingham-Garfield Railway fill, because I do not believe, myself, this water that comes down the bottom of
that gulch runs right through underneath-entirely underneath the railway fill. I know from
my own observation, when the entire waters from
that gulch came down and did not go through
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the drain tunnel that it did not come out in any
one place on the fill. For that remwn, I believe
it would be necessary to raise up, clear up into
the fill.
I also know from my experiPuce in other
dumps similarly constructed-when I say dumps
this time I mean Utah Copper Company dumps,
not railroad fills-that the waters do not always
flow along the bottom of them. (Tr. 2276) The
waters percolate laterally as well as perpendicularly downward; I have observed that in half
a dozen instances where that condition exists.
Of course I do believe that outside of the waters
that accumulated below this point, all of the
water could be collected at this location as given
by Mr. Crocker. The waters, however, that seep
below that point, could not he eolleeted; I know
I would never recommend a thing like this being
done, because you would never know when you
were going to be through spending money on
it. It would be a very difficult thing to maiutain, and expensive to construct originally. I
don't believe anyone after making a Rtndy and
knowing the conditionR would ever recommend
such a construction aR here proposed..
Counsel attempt to make much of their cross examination of Mr. Goodrich in the early stages of the
case wherein Mr. Goodrich expressed the opinion that
another tunnel could have been driven for the collection of these copper solutions at a cost of eight or ten
thousand dollars, and then described such diversion
facilities as "being across Hays ground," and as occupying "practically the entire width of Tract D."
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( Tr. 385) Mr. Goodrich did not express an opinion as
to the cost of maintaining such facilities. The defendants' proposal had not been made at that time.

This

was simply a fishing excursion by counsel to pump the
witness before divulging their plan, and on that ground
plaintiff's objection was sustained to further cross examination of that character. Mr. Goodrich was testifying to a facility constructed upon the defendants'
premises, but even as to such a tunnel this witness
said:
From my understanding of the word feasible,
it would not. Such a tunnel could be constructed, I presume, if anyone had the money and time
and inclination to do work of that kind.
and then counsel asked him if a tunnel could not have
been constructed from Markham Gulch to collect the
waters of Dixon Gulch, and Mr. Goodrich replied:
A. Yes sir, it would be possible to drive a
tunnel from Salt Lake City through the hill
too. Marham Gulch is over here. The Utah
Copper operations contemplate the filling of
Markham Gulch also and the tunnel suggested by
you, Mr. Rich, I presume would go through m
Markham Gulch below the steel bridge and drive
through the mountain across the Hays ground
into Dixon Gulch.
Q. As a matter of fact the tunnel would not
need to go but very little beneath the baE>e of
your fill, wouldn't it~
A. I don't know the tunnel you are tal kwg
to, it might be ten feet and it might be ten thous117

and feet. It is such an improbable suggestion
I would like to know more about what your :dea
is in answering it.
and then the court stopped further examination of that
character as not proper cross examination.
The costs of producing copper by this process of
precipitation are not in issue here and no testimony
has been introduced upon that subject.

Counsel volun-

teer conclusions with relation to such costs concerning
which they have neither knowledge nor information.
The statement at page 121 of their brief that "practioally the only cost

* * * aside from the slight ex-

pense of precipitation, would be the eight
thousand dollar

or ten

* * * cost''- original cost, not

maintenance- of defendants' proposed substitute facility.

If counsel's volunteering of testimony is to be-

come the vogue, we will say for counsel's information
·that at the present price of copper plaintiff's production
of copper by its precipitation process cannot be otherwise than at a necessary financial loss to plaintiff, although there be no more investment in the Dixon Gulch
diversion facility than the sum of $500.00.

If the trial of this case has been prolonged and
has compelled the employment of technical witnesses at
great expense, defendants produced that result.

When

plaintiff rested its case there were only 148 pages of
testimony upon plaintiff's direct examination.
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That

was plaintiff's case.

A glance at the record will fix

the responsibility for this expensive litigation.
'rherefore, the evidence in this case is that it is
necessary that plaintiff take the whole Tract D because
at certain seasons of the year and perhaps at aU seasons
a part of the copper solutions from plaintiff's dumps
find their way down Dixon Gulch into and through the
railroad fill upon that tract, seeping and percolating
from the fill to the surface and the bedrock beneath,
thence into the bottom of the gulch and down to Tract
C and plaintiff's intake. We trust it is apparent from
the evidence in this case that the only practical way
in which to collect the copper waters from the plaintiff's dumps in Dixon Gulch is that plaintiff has employed, i. e., their collection at the narrowest point in
the gulch, being at the toe of the railroad fill. Copper
water seeping and percolating or flowing laterally
through the dumps and fill easterly of the wings, raises,
tunnels, etc., defendants have suggested, would be lost
by any other method of collection or div,ersion. Also
defendants' suggestion is impracticable be.cause both
construction and maintance would be too expensive and
because it could not be presently ascertained at what
depth beneath the natural surface upon which the dumps
rest bedrock could be reached at the boundary line between the respective properties of the plaintiff and defendants. No doubt, as the defendants' w]tness Crocker
testified, bedrock would be reached somewhere by the
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tunnel he proposed, but where even he could not hazard
an opmwn. Plaintiff is not required to accept such a
substitute by any law with which we are familiar.
This is not one of the rare and exceptional cases
wherein the proposed taking would be unreasonable
or oppressive, but is squarely within the rule stated in
2 Lewis Eminent Domain, (3d Ed.) § 604, p. 1068, as
follows:

It may be objected that there is no necessity
of condemning the particular property, because
some other location might be made or other property obtained by agreement. But this objection
is unavailing. Except as specially restricted by
the legislature, those invested with the power of
eminent domain for .a public purpose, can make
their own location according to their own views
of what is best or expedient, and this discretion
cannot be controlled by the courts.
(G)
Point
The court below did not err in awarding costs to plaintiff.

Plaintiff's memorandum in accord with which costs
were taxed below will be found at page 4073 of the
judgment roll. It will be observed that no items were
included to cover filing fees of any character nor the
service of summons or other papers, nor annual premiums upon the surety bond required of plaintiff upon
the order for immediate occupation, but that instead the
only costs taxed were witnesses' per diem and mileage
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necessitated by defendants' effort to obtain a judgment
in their favor upon the issue of title to the copper solutions, an 'issue that defendants, not the plaintiff, injected into this suit.

Defendants' counsel at the outset

made it very clear that, in their conception of this suit,
it was merely a title action.

The following is an ex-

cerpt from a discussion between court and counsel:

(Tr.

11 to 18).
MR. P AR80NS: It is my understanding
that the hearing will proceed and we will be
limited as your Honor will be limited to the three
statutory questions.
MR. RICH: Do I understand we will be deprived of a jury trial on the question of determining title?

*

;;

*

MR. PARSONS. My notion about this is
our opponents are entitled to a jury trial only
upon one question, that is the ques6on of damages, the value of the right-of-way and the
damage to the balance of the larger tract due to
the taking. The question of the t~tle to the water
I think goes to our right to condemn. That
question must be determined by the court. If
we do not own that water I do not know very
well how we could take theirs.

* * *
MR. PARSONS: It is our intention to introduce evidence upon the three preliminary
questions provided by statute for the determination of the court. I think we enumerated those
this morning, so you know what ones I refer to.
MR. RICH: You indicated that title was
one of them1
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MR. PARSONS:

Our right to condemn.

MR. RICH: Your right to condemn, but
the extent of condemnation, thrut is, the title to
this water is the thing that is, as counsel says,
and as I have said, the paramount issue here.
That is not one of the three things, at all.

* * *
So far as the three things here are concerned,
they don't amount to anything, absolutely don't
amount to anything,
Again upon the occasion of defendants' motion for
non-suit (Tr. 740), defendants' counsel defined the
character of this suit as follows:
This suit is not a condemnation suit, but
is a suit to obtain title to property. There is no
question about that, at all.
That issue the defendants injected into this case
and therein failed. Plaintiff in this action has not condemned, and cannot be made to condemn, copper waters
or solutions, and consequently cannot be subjected to a
judgment for the value of such waters or solutions.
Plaintiff has been consistent always in its position that
it seeks no waters or solutions, and cannot be made to
take any waters or solutions it does not already own.
The judgment against plaintiff can be only the amount
stipulated. It is not buying copper waters or solutions.
Defendants resist the taxation of costs against
them on the ground that in a condemnation suit, al-
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though it be as they define it, merely ''a smoke screen''
( Tr. 740) to a title action, they are at liberty to inject
into the issues and to try out any fantastic theory not
germane to the action, of which they may conceive,
and although completely defeated, nevertheless tax
against plaintiff the costs they have thereby incurred,
that were it not so, defendants would be deprived of
the protection Section 22 of Article I of the Constitution
of Utah is designed to afford. The constitutional provision was not designed to secure to an unsuccessful
litigant in a title action the costs incurred by him in
unsuccessfully trying out groundless claims of title.
Neither constitution nor statute was framed for the
purpose of permitting an unsuccessful claimant to subject his successful adversary to the expense not only
of defending litigation brought by the first, devoid of
merit, but also to the payment of the costs the first had
incurred in trying out his erroneous theories, in other
words, to permit the unsuccessful party to experiment
at the risk and certain expense of the successful party
to that litigation!
The costs taxed were not incurred in ascertaining
the amount of the compensation to which the owner was
entitled by reason of the taking; that amount was stipulated at the sum of $500.00, which was the amount
offered defendants by plaintiff before the suit had been
commenced. (Tr. 3874) Had the defendants not conceived the idea of resorting to this effort to quiet in
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them title to the copper solutions on and above bedrock
from plaintiff's dumps in Dixon Gulch, this suit no
doubt would never have heen instituted. Upon the
matter of compensation for the premises condemned
and damages resulting from the taking, the parties were
never apart. Plaintiff always insisted, and the plea,dings clearly show, that plaintiff was condemning no
waters or copper solutions, and that if permitted to
take its judgment as prayed defendants by a subsequent
action, could have enjoined plaintiff's diversion of solutions or waters of which plaintiff was not the owner.
Defendants, however, elected to and did by their several
answers, make the effort in this condemnation suit, to
try title to the copper solutions plaintiff proposed to
collect. Had defendants not so elected and had they
not instituted another action against this plaintiff to
quiet title in them to these solutions and for injunctive
relief, as defendants might properly have done, and
have been unsuccessful in that action as here, of course
,this plaintiff would in that action have been allowed its
costs. The case at bar indeed became a title suit, but
it was the defendants who made it such. The defendants failed, and notwithstanding, they seek not only
to require the successful party to pay its own costs,
but theirs as well. That is straining the constitutional
provision too far.
In other words, the issue that was tried in this
case was not one in condemnation, but instead one of
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title to copper solutions for the collection and diversion
of which plaintiff sought to exercise the right of eminent
domain. The Colorado ,Supreme Court emphasizes the
distinction in Haver vs. Matonock, 75 Colo. 301, 225
Pac. 834. The plaintiff in that case sought to condemn a right of way for a pipe line for the conveyance
of water from a stated source for the irrigation of his
land, but the defendant answered the complaint and
denied that there was any water available for plaintiff
at that source, and hence denied that there was any
necessity for the exercise of the power of eminent
domain. The trial court dismissed the proceeding accordingly, but upon appeal the supreme court held:
We cannot hold that the question of necessity
involves the question whether there is any water
in existence which petitioners can use. * * *
The views above expressed are supported by the
langauge of the opinion in Gibson v. Cann, 28
Colo. 499, 66 Pac. 879, where it was said that-'In determining the question of necesity for taking lands sought to be condemned for right of way for irrigating ditches,
* * * the question as to * * *
what petitioner may be .able to accomplish
in the way of obtaining water which can
be utilized through his proposed ditch,
* * * cannot be inquired into.'
In Schneider v. Schenider, 36 Colo. 518, 86
Pac. 347, this court, in considering the question
of necessity for the construction of a ditch for
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which it was sought to condemn a right of way,
said:
'As to whether or not there is sufficient water for plaintiff's use, or as to
whether or not the plan is a practicable
or feasible one, is a matter which cannot
be determined in a proceeding of this
character-( citing Gibson v. Cann, supra).
'The various questions which may
arise as to the right to appropriate the
water cannot be here determined. * * *'
lf'urther on, the

court said :

'Appellant contends that a nonsuit
should have heen granted hecause plaintiff failed to prove that she was the owner
of a water right or had made an appropriation of water. We are not inclined to
concede this contention. An action under
the Eminent Domain Act cannot be converted into an action to quiet title. So
far as it is concerned it must remain an
action in eminent domain, and no issue
can be injected into the case which will
change its character. D. P. & I. Co. v.
D. & R. G. R. R. Co., 30 Colo. 215.'
The evidence presented by defendant before
the commissioners for the purpose of disproving
necessity was not, for reasons above indicated,
relevant to the question of necessity, as that
term is used in proceedings of this kind. There
was, in fact, no competent evidence to show absence of necessity. It was error not to set aside
the findings of the commission, because there
was no evidence on which the findings could be
based.
126

The judgment is reversed, and the cause remanded, for further proceedings not inconsistent
with the views herein expressed. (225 Pac. 834-5)
To the same effect is Publi'c Service Co. vs. City of
Loveland, 79 Colo. 216, 245 Pac. 493. That plaintiff
did not object to the trial in this action of the iS'sue
of title raised by defendants renders the issue no less
distinct, no less separate and apar.t from that of eminent
domain, no less an issue wherein the defeated parties
should in good conscience and in law suffer a judgment against them for taxable costs.
Section 7347 Compiled Laws of Utah 19H upon
this subject is as follows:
Costs may be allowed or not, and if allowed,
may be be apportioned between the parties on
the same or adverse sides, in the discretion of the
court.
That section is not meaningless.
In Truckee River General Electric Co. v. Durham,
38 Nev. 311, 149 Pac. 61, the court had the following
to say upon this subject :
Appellant complains of the order of the
court in assessing all of the costs of the proceedings to it. It is our opinion that in assessing
costs in these proceedings the court should take
into consideration the reasonableness of the valuation placed upon the land by the defendant in
his answer and the amount of damages claimed.
If the demand is so unreasonable as to justify
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a fair-minded person in litigating the question,
small consideration should be paid to his request
for judgment for the eosts which accrued after
the filing of the answer in the case.
The defendants in their answer alleged they were
damaged by the taking in an amount "upwards of
$200,000.00,'' but before this suit was instituted plaintiff offered them $500.00 in full of the value of the
premises ·taken and all damages sustained by them,
and at the conclusion of this extended litigation the defendants stipulated for a judgment for that identical
amount.

Defendants still insist that the copper solu-

tions are worth "upwards of $200,000.00," but plaintiff
is not seeking to condemn copper solutions, could not
do so in this action even if it wanted to, and could
not in this action be subjected to a judgment on that
account.

The stipulated amount of $500.00 covers the

premises taken and the damage sustained.
seeks nothing else.

Plaintiff

The nature of this suit cannot be

changed by the purported defense alleged in the answer
to gratify defendants' desire for a large judgment.
Defendants have received the full amount for which
they stipulated, hence an adequate compensation for all
property taken and the damages sustained, including
all costs of suit upon that issue, and there can be no
violation of constitutional provisions by requiring defendants to pay the taxable costs resulting from their
unsuccessful effort to quiet title in them to other prop-
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erty beyond the scope of this suit, the taking of which
would be impossible through or by means of this suit.
Determination of title to the copper solutions was
not a necessary incident of this suit-no more so than
an inquiry into the precise nature of plaintiff's title
in or to its dumps in Dixon Gulch, nor into the many
other matters the courts have excluded from cons.ideration in condemnation suits.
In re Cedar Rapids, 85 la. 39, 51 N. W. 1142;
Mercer Co. v. Wolff, 237 Ill. 74;
Chicago v. Sanitary Dist., 272 Ill. 37, 111
N. g_ 491;
Dallas v. Hallock, 44 Ore. 246, 75 Pac. 204;
State v. Superior Ct., 42 Wash. 521, 85 Pac.
256;
Tenn. Coal, Iron & R. R. Co. v. Birmingham
So. Ry. Co., 128 Ala. 526, 29 So. 455;
Santa Ana v. Brunner, 132 Cal. 234, 64 Pac.
287;
Richland School 'rp. v. Overmeyer, 164 Ind.
382, 73 N. E. 811;
Kansas etc. Ry. Co. v. N. W. Coal & Min.
Co., 161 Mo. 288, 61 S. W. 684, 84 Am.
St. Rep. 717, 51 L. R. A. 936;
Caretta Ry. Co. v. V a-Pocahontas Coal Co.
62 W. V a. 185, 57 S. E. 401;
This suit was one to condemn Tract D on and
above bedrock as a conduit by means of which to convey to plaintiff's intake on Tract C the copper solutions from the dumps above in Dixon Gulch, and the
parties stipulated the value of the premises taken and
the damages to result from that taking. Had defend129

ants not elected, and the plaintiff not permitted defendants, to try out in this action the question of title
to the copper solutions flowing at the so-called Hays
Spring, the condemnation suit would have been completely disposed of by that stipulation.

If defendants

thereafter concluded plaintiff was taking defendants'
copper solutions, the judgment in the condemnation suit
would not have been res adjudicata upon the issue of
title, because the latter was not within the issues in the
condemnation suit.

No constitutional provision is vio-

lated by the taxation of costs in favor of the successful
party to an action to try title, and accordingly no
error was committed by the court below in taxing such
costs upon the trial of that issue below.

The issue re-

mains the same whether injected into a condemnation
suit or tried in a separate action.
Somewhat this situation arose in the case of Matter
of Cortland, etc., Horse R. R. Co.,

ns

N. Y. 363, wherein

the facts were these: one railroad company attempted to
condemn a crossing over the tracks of another railroad company.

The two companies were represented

by eminent counsel and the case was long and bitterly
fought upon the question of the right to condemn, the matter of damage being, as here, of no especial moment. The
court allowed costs in favor of the condemner, holding
that no constitutional provision had been violated by
such award because the defendant had not been deprived of a fair compensation for what was taken.
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The quantum of damage had not been the issue tried and
consequently the case of Matter of Walsh, 94 N.Y. 287,
did not apply.

The court held:

The application in this case was a special
proceeding (Code Civ. Pro., §§ 3333, 3334), and
according to the general rule the costs were in the
discretion of the court ( §3240). The claim that
the proceeding having been instituted by the petitioner to acquire a crossing over the track of the
appellant, the latter could not be compelled to
pay the cost of the proceeding, under the decision
in Matter of Walsh (94 N. Y. 287), is not well
founded. * * * The case shows that the appellant in substance declined to permit the petitioner to cross its tracks, and when the commissioners were appointed, the question litigated
before them related to the place and manner of
crossing, whether it should be at, or above, or
below grade, and not at all to the question of
compensation, as to which no evidence was given.
'.l_1he points of crossing considered by the commissioners, and as to which the evidence related,
were a crossing on the highway and one outside
of the highway but near to it, and there was no
practical difficulty in giving evidence bearing
upon the amount of compensation, if that question
was deemed important.
Upou the facts presented to the court on the
motion in respect to costs, the court would have
been justified in finding that the appellant, on
the hearing before the commissi,oners, waived aU
claim for compensation beyond nominal damages.
The litigation, from the first, has been most determined and persistent; on the one side to secure, and on the other to prevent a crossing as
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desired by the respondent. 'rhere is no constitutional right involved in the oruer of the Special
Term imposing the costs of the litigation upon
the appellant, and we cannot review its discretion. * * *
Costs of the condemning party on appeal by the
property owner may be allowed against the owner.
City of Oakland v. Pacific Coast Lumber &
Mill Co., 172 Cal. 332, 156 Pac. 468;
Town of Redmond v. Perrigo, 84 Wash. 407,
146 Pac. 838.
CONCLUSION
As this question has been passed upon adversely
to the defendants by two judges of the court below,
first, by the late Morris L. Ritchie, and then the Honorable Roger I. McDonough, and is now brought here by
the defendants for a third consideration.
One is not greatly impressed by defendants' resistance, the only object of which is to enrich themselves
by the seizure of plaintiff's copper solutions, an artificial
product resulting from plaintiff's industry and investment, from the conduct of plaintiff's leaching operations
upon plaintiff's premises, a product every ingredient
of which is the absolute property of the plaintiff. Defendants seek the aid of this court by which to accomplish that seizure.

They make a very strenuous effort

to persuade this court to deny plaintiff the right to
convey its solutions across defendants' premises, that
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defendants may appropriate them. They urge upon this
court authority to the effect that "when the oil left the
land of the opera tors it became abandoned property,"
(page 39 Appellants' Brief) defendants claiming these
solutions upon that theory, yet by the same effort seeking to prevent plaintiff's condemnation sought by this
action whereby to avoid such an abandonment. If
plaintiff

~be

permitted to condemn the easement sought,

the authorities cited by defendants will be in no manner
relevant. As did the defendants in the case of Utah
Copper Co. v. Montana-Bingham Consolidated Mining
Oo., so do the defendants in the case at bar, strive
strenuously to defeat plaintiff's effort to condemn the
easement necessary t~o prevent the escape and loss of
plaintiff's solutions, thus to insure plaintiff's abandonment of its solutions and the successful consummation
of defendants' effort to acquire them.

The defendants,

willfully it seems to us, refuse to admit the purpose
for which this action is brought. If plaintiff be permitted to eondemn, plaintiff's solutions will be saved
to plaintiff, not abandoned by it. In their effort to
defeat the condemnation and thereby accomplish the
abandonment defendants require, defendants assume
the abandonment the maintenance of this suit will avoid,
a false assumption upon which defendants attempt to
erect a defense.
Pending the action the copper solutions have been
saved fr,om abandonment by order of court putting
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plaintiff in possession for the purpose of conveying
plaintiff's copper solutions across Tract D to and into
plaintiff's intake, by which order plaintiff's boundary
line was, pending the action, extended across Tract D to
and including plaintiff's intake. These solutions are
concededly plaintiff's at plaintiff's boundary line, and
if plaintiff be permitted to condemn this channel across
Tract D to plaintiff's intake, plaintiff's boundary line
will cease as such and those solutions will have flowed,
seeped or percolated along the course wherein plaintiff
shall have acquired the right, ,title and easement so to
conduct them; they will never have passed beyond plaintiff's estate, will never have escaped from plaintiff's
possession, will never have ceased to be captured, collected, impounded and preserved by plaintiff within this
well-known and defined channel to plaintiff's intake, a
channel as well known and clearly defined as the very
pipe line into which the solutions flow at plaintiff's
intake and by which they are conveyed to plaintiff's
precipitating plant. Predicated as it is upon the erroneous assumption that plaintiff's solutions have been
abandoned, defendant's argument has no relevancy whatever to the case at bar.
The judgment below should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
DrcKsoN, ELLrs, PARSONS & McCREA,
Attorneys for Plaintiff
and Respondent.
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